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Striking a Sensible Balance on the
Legality of Defensive First Strikes
DavidA. Sadoff*

ABSTRACT

This Article seeks to develop a clear and sensible legal
standard governing defensive first strikes writ large in interstate conflicts.
Imprecise or improperly gauged legal
parameters can contribute to an increased risk of hostilities,
whether due to abuse, error, or even reasoned calculation. The
implications of such conduct for states and their populations
alike can be enormous. Although many proposals posit
constructive guideposts for such a standard, they tend to be
either abstract in structure or limited in material application.
This Article sets forth a legal standard that aims to be
simultaneously systematic in approach, comprehensive in scope,
and functional in operation-allwhile embracing the elemental
virtues of clarity and realism. After defining the presumptive
baseline standard, the Article sets forth a legal policy
framework upon which to erect a standardpremised on several
key attributes and contemporary security circumstances while
fostering legal legitimacy and diminishing the incidence of
armed conflict. The specific proposal for reform consists of three
substantive elements: an evidentiary standard, a set of
procedural safeguards, and a standard of review. The Article
also compares the prevailing standard with the proposed
standardand evaluates the latter'sprospects for adoption.

* The Author is a doctoral candidate in Public International Law at the Universit6
de Gen~ve in Switzerland. He formerly served as Deputy Legal Adviser to the National
Security Council and as Assistant General Counsel at the Central Intelligence Agency.
All statements of fact, opinion, and analysis expressed herein are entirely his own and
are not attributable to the U.S. government in whole or in part. The Author expresses
his appreciation to Ashley Deeks for her insightful comments.
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I. INTRODUCTION
Suppose there are two medium-sized rival states, Alpha and
Delta, with rapidly deteriorating political relations. Suppose further
that Alpha suddenly made explicit threats of attack while deploying
forces in unprecedented numbers along their common border. At
what point, if any, should Delta be permitted unilaterally' to strike
first in self-defense? What criteria should govern such a decision?
What level of confidence or evidentiary proof must Delta have that
Alpha is preparing to launch an attack? Should Delta be required to
attempt a peaceful means of resolution before resorting to force and,
if so, to what extent? What parameters should guide the nature,
scale, and targeting of the defensive strike itself? What standard of
review should the international community apply to determine the
lawfulness of the actions taken?
Should it make a difference whether Alpha and Delta each
possess highly sophisticated arsenals with deterrent capability or a
considerable disparity in military capabilities exists between them?
Should it matter whether Alpha was suspected of mounting a
conventional ground attack against Delta, dispatching a military unit
to initiate a campaign of "pin-prick" attacks 2 against Delta, or
launching a short-range missile with a nuclear warhead against one

1.
The term "unilateral" in this context has a dual meaning. First, it connotes
the exercise of "individual" self-defense (i.e., by a single state) as opposed to "collective"
self-defense (i.e., joint or multilateral). Second, the term is intended to signify an action
undertaken absent a determination by the U.N. Security Council, which, unlike states,
is expressly permitted to authorize force to address emerging threats (known as
"collective security"). U.N. Charter arts. 39, 42. Issues arising under collective selfdefense or collective security lie outside the scope of this Article.
2.
Pin-prick strikes are low-intensity assaults that are typically part of a
pattern or series and are being employed with increasing frequency around the globe.
This Article addresses the legal implications of pin-prick strikes in several analytical
contexts.
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of its metropolitan areas? Would the situation be viewed differently if
Delta was a small nation with a population distribution such that its
very survival was jeopardized by Alpha's threat? This Article seeks
to provide an analytical framework for tackling these and related
normative questions.
Specifically, this Article aims to develop a clear, practicable legal
standard to govern the use of first strikes in self-defense in interstate conflicts. 3 This type of action is referred to herein as "proactive
self-defense," which is intended to operate as a value-neutral,
umbrella term capturing the full range of recognized nonreactive
7
6
5
forms 4 of self-defense: interceptive, anticipatory, and preemptive.
A single designation not only provides a convenient label for such
wide-ranging conduct but also overcomes any confusion that can
derive from the uncertain and often overlapping definitions applied to
Although other phrases may convey a
its component concepts.

This Article is exclusively concerned with relationships between states.
3.
Accordingly, it does not address defensive first strikes launched against either U.N.
forces or non-state actors (e.g., terrorist groups) unless, in the latter case, state
attribution can be shown. Although some features of this analysis may apply equally to
self-defensive force against non-state actors, the dynamics of such conflicts are distinct
and therefore the overall approach outlined in this Article is not necessarily replicable.
In addition, because the Article's focus is more precisely between perceived aggressor
states and defending states, the legal permissibility of any self-defensive force affecting
a neutral third state is beyond the scope of this inquiry.
4.
Reactive self-defense is the use of force taken to defend oneself after
suffering a blow; by contrast, nonreactive measures are those taken beforehand.
Excluded from this typology is "preventive self-defense," which, because it occurs under
remote and indefinite circumstances, bears greater resemblance to an offensive than a
defensive posture. See David A. Sadoff, A Question of Determinacy: The Legal Status of
Anticipatory Self-Defense, 40 GEO. J.INT'L L. 523, 531 n.36 (2009).
5.
Interceptive self-defense entails a military response to an attack that has
commenced but has not yet been consummated, i.e., it is being mounted, has been
launched but not yet crossed the target state's territorial boundary, or in any event
irrevocable actions are underway. YORAM DINSTEIN, WAR, AGGRESSION AND SELFDEFENCE 191 (4th ed. 2005).
6.
A state exercises anticipatory self-defense when it "beats its enemy to the
punch" by launching an attack against a state that has manifested its capability and
intent to attack imminently. The latter state tends to be in the final preparations for
an attack through maneuvers or deployments. Under this posture, an "armed attack" is
on the "brink of launch" and the defending state chooses to launch one of its own first.
MARY ELLEN O'CONNELL, AMERICAN SOCIETY OF INTERNATIONAL LAW TASK FORCE ON
TERRORISM, THE MYTH OF PRE-EMPTIVE SELF-DEFENSE 2 n.10 (2002), available at
http://www.asil.org/taskforce/oconnell.pdf.
7.
The underlying purpose of preemptive self-defense is to eliminate an
apparently escalating military threat even though, at the moment, it remains entirely
conjectural. In essence, a defending state seeks to "forestall processes" that in the nearterm "may in the future develop into highly intense coercion or violence" by striking
"while these processes still embody only a low level of coercion." MYRES S. MCDOUGAL
& FLORENTINO P. FELICIANO, LAW AND MINIMUM WORLD PUBLIC ORDER: THE LEGAL
REGULATION OF INTERNATIONAL COERCION 210-11 (1961). Such self-defense is still
principally defensive in character, although it also may be dictated in part by strategic
motives, such as maintaining a balance of power. Sadoff, supra note 4, at 531.
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comparable meaning, the utility of this term stems from its
nomenclature parallel to other forms of self-defense, its affirmative
orientation, and its lack of potential misidentification with other
similar-sounding terms such as "preemptive strike" and the more
narrowly defined and distinct concept of "preemptive self-defense."
Many legal standards have been recommended or applied over
the years concerning the nature and scope of proactive self-defense.
Those standards run the gamut from the formula enunciated by U.S.
Secretary of State Daniel Webster in 1841 in connection with the
Caroline incident 8 to the doctrine promulgated in the Bush
Administration's National Security Strategy of 2002.9 Many of these
proffer helpful guideposts for assessing a state's use of proactive
defensive force but, as a rule, they tend to fall into one of two
categories: (1) generalized standards, reminiscent of political science
views, consisting of briefly enumerated elements that nevertheless
encompass a holistic view of the international threat environment;1 0

8.
The Caroline incident is examined in Part II infra. Some would argue that
the lower bound of this continuum is not the Webster formula at all, but rather
interceptive self-defense. That concept, however, has only the slimmest margin of
practical applicability; indeed, there is virtually no historical instance in which such
defensive force has ever been exercised. Moreover, given the character of the
underlying attack, the term arguably is more consonant with reactive self-defense. Guy
B. Roberts, Self-Help in Combating State-Sponsored Terrorism: Self Defense and
Peacetime Reprisals, 19 CASE W. RES. J. INT'L L. 243, 275 (1987).
9.
THE WHITE HOUSE, THE NATIONAL SECURITY STRATEGY OF THE UNITED
STATES OF AMERICA, Sept. 17, 2002, available at http://www.globalsecurity.org/
militaryflibrary/policy/nationallnss-020920.pdf [hereinafter NSS 2002]. The use of force
strategy outlined therein, which has come to be commonly known as the "Bush
Doctrine," is perhaps less a "proposal" for international consideration than a policy
statement. That said, it is quite likely that the statement was also designed to provide
a template for other, particularly similarly situated, states in fashioning their counterterrorism and counter-proliferation policies. This targeted strategy applies to "rogue
states and terrorists" alike, and argues that certain threats have become so significant
that the United States can ill-afford to wait for those threats to fully materialize before
taking action. Id. at 15. The proffered alternative-"preemptive" self-defense--calls for
the use of force to "eliminate a specific threat" before an attack actually occurs "even if
uncertainty remains as to the time and place of the enemy's attack" and even "before
[such threats necessarily] are fully formed." Id. at 15-16; George W. Bush, Prefatory
Letter, in NSS 2002, supra. This approach constitutes a "considerable expansion of the
existing boundaries
of international law." JUDITH
GARDAM, NECESSITY,
PROPORTIONALITY AND THE USE OF FORCE BY STATES 147 (2004).
10.
See, e.g., The Secretary-General, A More Secure World: Our Shared
Responsibility: Report of the Secretary-General's High-Level Panel on Threats,
Challenges and Change,
207, 209, U.N. Doc. A/59/565 (Dec. 2004) [hereinafter HighLevel Panel Report] (expressing hope that states would subscribe to its five minimum
criteria to be taken into account when "considering whether to authorize or endorse the
use of military force"); WILLIAM V. O'BRIEN, THE CONDUCT OF JUST AND LIMITED WAR
133 (1981) (postulating a three-part test to govern anticipatory self-defense); Abraham
D. Sofaer, On the Necessity of Pre-emption, 14 EUR. J. INT'L L. 209, 221-24 (2003)
(advancing four "factors and circumstances related to establishing the legitimacy of
using [preemptive self-defense] under international law principles and UN Charter
values").
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or (2) fairly detailed, legally-based frameworks whose scope is
tailored to address only a single type of threat.1 '
Some
recommendations, however, are both abstract in structure and
12
limited in material application.
Although each of these proposals is valuable in its own right for
advancing the dialogue and identifying priority concerns and criteria,
the abstract proposals lack necessary detail and, as a result, are of
less utility in framing a meaningful legal standard, while others may
provide the requisite granularity but are too limited in scope to be of
general use. This Article seeks to build upon the strengths of earlier
proposals and set forth a legal framework that aims to be, at once,
systematic in approach, comprehensive in scope, and functional in
operation-all while faithful to the cardinal virtues of clarity and
realism.
It is worth pausing momentarily to address the various needs for
a clear and meaningful legal standard, particularly its application in
the context of militarized states that might well prefer the more
ambiguous standard of the status quo. First, a clear and meaningful
legal standard would diminish the likelihood that a state will launch
a strike out of confusion or ignorance of the governing standard or
that a state will rely on legal ambiguity to support unilateral military
measures on pretextual grounds. Second, a clear standard would
enable third parties and the international community at large to
effectively distinguish between legitimate and illegitimate actions,
and to cast their military and diplomatic support accordingly behind
the state whose conduct more closely conformed to international law.
Third, a meaningful standard would more likely ensure that state
conduct in contravention of its elements is properly identified,
condemned, and punished.

11.
See, e.g., Hannes Herbert Hofmeister, Neither the 'Caroline Formula' nor
the 'Bush Doctrine'-An Alternative Framework to Assess the Legality of Preemptive
Strikes, 2 U. NEW ENG. L.J. 31, 45-50 (2005) (Austl.) (propounding "an alternative
legal framework which could guide the decisions of states on whether to use force in
self-defence in the face of a prospective catastrophicattack") (emphasis added); Mikael
Nabati, International Law at a Crossroads: Self-Defense, Global Terrorism, and
Preemption (A Call to Rethink the Self-Defense Normative Framework), 13 TRANSNAT'L
L. & CONTEMP. PROBS. 771, 797-801 (2003) (advancing a "narrow terrorist exception"
to the preemptive self-defense doctrine); Beth M. Polebaum, National Defense in
InternationalLaw: An Emerging Standard for a Nuclear Age, 59 N.Y.U. L. REV. 187,
208-12 (1984) ("propos[ing] an international law standard concerning imminency and
anticipatory self-defense for a nuclear age").
12.
The Bush Doctrine fits this characterization because it justifies the use of
preemptive self-defense in the specific counterterrorism and counter-proliferation
contexts while couching itself in almost unbounded terms, and thereby provides little
concrete guidance as to its operational parameters. The Bush Administration's updated
National Security Strategy in 2006 left unelaborated the 2002 approach with respect to
the use of force in self-defense. THE WHITE HOUSE, THE NATIONAL SECURITY STRATEGY
OF THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, Mar. 16, 2006, ch. V.C.4, available at
http://www.iwar.org.uk/military/resources/nss-2006/nss2OO6.pdf.
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Part II of this Article attempts to define the baseline legal
standard for this review, a natural and necessary starting point for
any legal reform. Part III sets forth a legal policy framework; it is
against this backdrop that the current state of the law may be
evaluated on its merits and a more suitable standard may be erected
in response to fundamental principles and contemporary needs. Part
IV briefly reviews key methodological considerations regarding the
development of a legal standard, and Part V presents the Author's
detailed proposal for reform.

II.

DEFINING THE BASELINE LEGAL STANDARD

The task of crafting a new legal standard immediately presents
the confounding problem of defining the current law. Although there
is no clear international consensus regarding the overall lawfulness of
proactive self-defense, 13 there is a discernible pattern of state practice
supporting the legality of anticipatory self-defense-albeit under
strictly limited circumstances. 14 (The same cannot be said of the
more temporally distant preemptive self-defense. 15) The adoption of
this emerging consensus as the presumed prevailing standard-for
the sake of argument-allows this Article to bring a more robust
normative perspective to bear on the issue of proactive self-defense,
as it will provide a useful and tangible baseline against which to
present a critique, identify specific areas requiring redress, and
ultimately shape the reform proposal.
While this conceptual approach may amount to taking liberties
with the current state of the law, particularly in light of the literal
text of Article 51 of the UN Charter, 16 it actually constitutes no more

13.

GARDAM, supra note 9, at 138; Jean Combacau, The Exception of Self-

Defense in U.N. Practice, in THE CURRENT LEGAL REGULATION OF THE USE OF FORCE,

at 9, 24-25 (Antonio Cassese ed., 1986); Albrecht Randelzhofer, Article 51, in THE
CHARTER OF THE UNITED NATIONS: A COMMENTARY, at 659, 675 (Bruno Simma et al.
eds., 1995).
14.

ANTONIO CASSESE, INTERNATIONAL LAW IN A DIVIDED WORLD 232-33

(1986); T.D. Gill, The Temporal Dimension of Self-Defence: Anticipation, Pre-emption,
Prevention and Immediacy, 11 J. CONFLICT & SEC. L. 361, 366 (2006); Sadoff, supra
note 4, at 574-75. But see TARCISIO GAZZINI, THE CHANGING RULES ON THE USE OF

FORCE IN INTERNATIONAL LAW 151 (2005) (noting insufficient evidence to detect any
developing consensus regarding the right of anticipatory self-defense).
15.
High-Level Panel Report, supra note 10,
189-191; STANIMIR A.
ALEXANDROV, SELF-DEFENSE AGAINST THE USE OF FORCE IN INTERNATIONAL LAW 165

(1996).
16.
Article 51, which resides in Chapter VII, contains the only provision
regarding self-defense in the Charter, which itself constitutes the principal
conventional law on the use of force and self-defense. For decades, much debate has
ensued over the proper interpretation of Article 51, especially in its interplay with
customary international law, a parallel body of law. That discussion lies outside the
scope of this Article, which, for present purposes, will construe its language as
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than a modest stretch, given the noteworthy support anticipatory
self-defense has recently garnered. 17 To the extent the assumed
standard can be accurately appraised, it appears to closely resemble
the restrictive formula set forth with respect to the Caroline incident

of 1837.18
The Caroline incident occurred during a period of armed
insurrection against British colonial rule in Canada. 19 Although the
United States maintained a neutral posture regarding the dispute, a
number of American citizens along the U.S.-Canada border provided
aid to the Canadian rebels. 20 The Caroline, an American-owned
steamship, was allegedly being used to transport supplies and
reinforcements to support rebels residing on the Canadian side of the

consistent with the so-called counter-restrictionist view that admits the exercise of selfdefense in instances not limited to when a state has already suffered an "armed
attack." E.g., Matt S. Nydell, Tensions Between International Law and Strategic
Security: Implications of Israel's Preemptive Raid on Iraq's Nuclear Reactor, 24 VA. J.
INT'LL. 459, 485-86 (1983). Article 51 reads as follows:
Nothing in the present Charter shall impair the inherent right of individual or
collective self-defence if an armed attack occurs against a Member of the
United Nations, until the Security Council has taken measures necessary to
maintain international peace and security. Measures taken by Members in the
exercise of this right of self-defence shall be immediately reported to the
Security Council and shall not in any way affect the authority and
responsibility of the Security Council under the present Charter to take at any
time such action as it deems necessary in order to maintain or restore
international peace and security.
U.N. Charter art. 51 (emphasis added).
17.
By way of indication, within the last few years, the anticipatory selfdefense doctrine has been recognized in effect both by leading U.K. international law
scholars who contributed to a set of principles published by the Royal Institute of
International Affairs, more commonly known as the Chatham House, see ELIZABETH
WILMSHURST, CHATHAM HOUSE, PRINCIPLES OF INTERNATIONAL LAW ON THE USE OF
FORCE BY STATES IN SELF-DEFENCE 4 (2005) [hereinafter CHATHAM HOUSE PRINCIPLES]
('"The law on self-defence encompasses more than the right to use force in response to
an ongoing attack."), and by the U.N. Secretary-General, who endorsed and adopted
the December 2004 report of his High-Level Panel on Threats, Challenges and Change,
High-Level Panel Report, supra note 10 and then reaffirmed that view in 2005 through
his report entitled, The Secretary General, In Larger Freedom: Towards Development,
Security and Human Rights for All, 24, delivered to the General Assembly, U.N. Doc.
A/59/2005 (Mar. 21, 2005), available at http://www.un.org/largerfreedom.
TO
INTRODUCTION
MODERN
AKEHURST'S
PETER
MALANCZUK,
18.
INTERNATIONAL LAW 314 (1997); Oscar Schachter, In Defense of InternationalRules on
the Use of Force, 53 U. CHI. L. REV. 113, 136 (1986). Notably, although the
International Court of Justice (ICJ)has yet to cite to the Caroline formula in any of its
judgments or opinions, James A. Green, Docking the Caroline: Understanding the
Relevance of the Formula in Contemporary Customary InternationalLaw Concerning
Self-Defense, 14 CARDOZO J. INT'L & COMP. L. 429, 447-48 (2006), it must also be
acknowledged that the ICJ has yet to be squarely presented with a dispute over a first
use of force allegedly taken in self-defense.
Green, supra note 18, at 433.
19.
20.
Id.
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Niagara River. 21 One night, British soldiers set fire to the Caroline
while it was docked on the U.S. shore and subsequently let it drift
down the Niagara Falls. 22 When the United States protested, the
British defended the conduct by claiming to have acted out of
"necessity of self-defence and self-preservation. ' 23
In April 1841, Secretary of State Webster sent a letter to the
British government, articulating a standard for self-defense that
required a showing of
necessity of self-defence, instant, overwhelming, leaving no choice of
means, and no moment of deliberation. It will be for it to show, also,
that the local authorities of Canada, even supposing the necessity of the
moment authorized them to enter the territories of the United States at
all, did nothing unreasonableor excessive; since the act justified by the
necessity of self-defence, must be limited by that necessity, and kept
24
clearly within it.

In July 1842, Britain's Lord Ashburton accepted Webster's proposed
formulation. 25 Although much debate persists as to the standard's
true meaning and application, 26 it is widely treated as a generally
accurate statement of anticipatory self-defense. 27
The formula
appears, in its barest sense, to stand for three elements-necessity,
imminence, and proportionality-required to justify an initial strike
in self-defense.
Regrettably, neither Webster nor his British
interlocutor explicated those elements. Yet, although the terms are
not uniformly understood, it is still possible to outline their essential
meanings.

21.
Id.
22.
Id.
23.
IAN BROWNLIE, INTERNATIONAL LAW AND THE USE OF FORCE BY STATES 42
(1963) (quoting R.Y. Jennings, The Caroline and McLeod Cases, 32 AM. J. INT'L L. 82,
85 (1938)).
24.
Id. at 43 (emphasis added).
25.
Id.
26.
Many believe, for example, that the Webster formula reflected a less
generous standard than then-prevailing state practice suggested. E.g., Green, supra
note 18, at 438-40; David B. Rivkin, Jr. et al., Preemption and Law in the Twenty-First
Century, 5 CHI. J. INT'L L. 467, 469 (2004). Some have interpreted the standard as
strictly limited to use against a non-state actor, because actions by the Caroline and its
crew were not attributable to the U.S. government. E.g., Green, supra note 18, at 44344. Some question the formula's very relevance for influencing or determining an
anticipatory self-defense standard, as: (1) the formula expressed an essentially political
agreement, O'BRIEN, supra note 10, at 132-33, (2) the formula was developed at a time
when the notion of self-defense had a distinctly different meaning than it does today,
ROBERT KOLB, SELF-DEFENCE AND PREVENTIVE WAR AT THE BEGINNING OF THE
MILLENNIUM 112 (2004), and (3) the threat environment has changed to the point
where such a dated formula no longer applies, Myres S. McDougal, The Soviet-Cuban
Quarantineand Self-Defense, 57 AM. J. INT'L L. 597, 598 (1963).
27.
ALEXANDROV, supra note 15, at 19-20; CHRISTOPHER C. JOYNER,
INTERNATIONAL LAW IN THE 21ST CENTURY: RULES FOR GLOBAL GOVERNANCE 168
(2005); Leo Van den hole, Anticipatory Self-Defence Under InternationalLaw, 19 AM.
U. INT'L L. REV. 69, 97 (2003).
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Necessity. It must be necessary for a state to resort to force in
defending itself against an attack. 28 The use of force must be the
"only viable option" remaining to thwart an attack; that is, no feasible
Consistent with this notion, all
lesser alternative can exist. 29
reasonable measures must have been taken to exhaust any
practicable nonmilitary options, such as undertaking diplomacy or
30
imposing economic sanctions.
Imminence.
Linked closely to necessity is the concept of
imminence, which traditionally requires that a threatened harm be
Imminence is
immediate or otherwise temporally proximate. 31
perhaps best understood as a subsidiary element of necessity because
it presupposes a state of necessity to the extent that no realistic
window of opportunity can remain to pursue nonmilitary
alternatives. 32 Further, if a state acts too long before a threat
manifests, one may question whether it was indeed necessary to
33
exercise self-defensive force under the circumstances.
Proportionality. Proportionality in the present jus ad bellum
34
context is not to be confused with either its jus in bello counterpart
or with equality or symmetry between the quantum, intensity, or
Rather, proportionality functionally
means of force used. 35
represents the minimum extent of force necessary to meet the
objective of self-defense, i.e., to repel the threat faced. 36 In other

28.
DAVID RODIN, WAR AND SELF-DEFENSE 40 (2002).
29.
Michael N. Schmitt, Preemptive Strategies in InternationalLaw, 24 MICH.
J. INT'L L. 513, 530, 535-36 (2002); Dominika Svarc, Redefining Imminence: The Use of
Force Against Threats and Armed Attacks in the Twenty-First Century, 13 ILSA J. INT'L
& COMp. L. 171, 181 (2006).
30.
GAZZINI, supra note 14, at 146-47; IRVING J. SLOAN, THE LAW OF SELFDEFENSE: LEGAL AND ETHICAL PRINCIPLES 46 (1987).
31.
GARDAM, supra note 9, at 154; Michael N. Schmitt, U.S. Security Strategies:
A Legal Assessment, 27 HARV. J.L. & PUB. POLY 737, 755 (2004).
32.
RODIN, supra note 28, at 41; Roberts, supra note 8, at 277.
33.
O'CONNELL, supra note 6, at 9; RODIN, supra note 28, at 41.
the concepts
of
34.
Although
sometimes
treated
interchangeably,
proportionality differ markedly between jus ad bellum and jus in bello. A
disproportionate strike in the jus in bello context is based on the following calculation:
when the "expected" loss of civilian life and damage to civilian property "would be
excessive in relation to the concrete and direct military advantage anticipated."
Protocol Additional to the Geneva Conventions of 1949, and Relating to the Protection
of Victims of International Armed Conflicts (Protocol 1) art. 51(5)(b), June 8, 1977,
[hereinafter Additional
available at http://www.unhchr.ch/html/menu3/b/93.htm
Protocol I]. Additional Protocol I would apply to nonparties, including the United
States, insofar as its provisions constitute customary international law.
35.
RODIN, supra note 28, at 42; CHRISTIAN WICKER, THE CONCEPTS OF
PROPORTIONALITY AND STATE CRIMES IN INTERNATIONAL LAW 44-47 (2006); Robert
Ago, Addendum to the Eighth Report on State Responsibility 121, [1980] 2 Y.B. Int'l
L. Comm'n 69, U.N. Doc. AICN.4/318/Add.5-7/1982 [hereinafter Ago Report in 1980 ILC
YB.].
36.
D. W. BOWETT, SELF-DEFENSE IN INTERNATIONAL LAW 269 (1958);
McDOUGAL & FELICIANO, supra note 7, at 241-43; NAGENDRA SINGH & EDWARD
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words, the use of force in self-defense may not be "unreasonable or
excessive" in meeting those defensive ends. 37 Thus, if the duration or
geographic reach of a "defensive" strike extended unreasonably
beyond the point at which38 the threat was repelled, it would be
considered disproportionate.
One leading treatise describes the current standard governing
self-defense, taking into account the elements articulated by Webster,
as exhibiting the following general conditions:
(a) an attack is launched, or is immediately threatened, against a
state's territory or forces (and probably its nationals); (b) there is an
urgent necessity for defensive action against that attack; (c) there is no
practicable alternative to action in self-defence, and in particular
another state or other authority which has the legal powers to stop or
prevent the infringement does not, or cannot, use them to that effect;
(d) the action taken by way of self-defence is limited to what is
39
necessary to stop or prevent the infringement.

It is reasonable to characterize this standard as highly restrictive,
affording a defending state very limited legal latitude to strike first in
self-defense.
There is no doubt that, whatever else can be said of the current
presumed legal standard, it lacks specificity. With that caveat in
mind, this Article will nevertheless endeavor to identify the
standard's key features. As a starting point, a principal condition
would be imminence of an attack. 40 The burden of proof would lie
with the defending state to prove that force was justifiable under the
circumstances. 41 The state would have to provide "sound" evidence
"capable of objective assessment"4 2 in order to convince the
international community that the attack was "certain" or virtually
43
certain.
In addition, the "defending" state should be able to prove that,
before engaging in hostilities, it attempted to resolve the conflict

MCWHINNEY, NUCLEAR WEAPONS AND CONTEMPORARY INTERNATIONAL LAW 100
(1989); Gill, supra note 14, at 366.
This quoted language derives from the Caroline standard discussed at
37.
supra Part II. See also DINSTEIN, supra note 5, at 210 (defining proportionality as a
"standard of reasonableness in the response to force by counter-force"); WICKER, supra
note 35, at 39 (defining proportionality as the use of force be necessary to defend
oneself without being excessive).
GARDAM, supra note 9, at 179-80; SLOAN, supra note 30, at 47.
38.
39.
SIR ROBERT JENNINGS & SIR ARTHUR WATTS, 1 OPPENHEIM'S
INTERNATIONAL LAW 422 (9th ed. 1992).
40.
CASSESE, supra note 14, at 233; D.W. GRIEG, INTERNATIONAL LAW 680-81
(1970); Gill, supra note 14, at 366.
41.
BROWNLIE, supra note 23, at 214.
42.

CHATHAM HOUSE PRINCIPLES, supra note 17, at 8-9. But see O'CONNELL,

supra note 6, at 9 (applying "clear and convincing" evidence test in cases where an
"enemy is preparing to attack again").
43.
O'CONNELL, supra note 6, at 8; see also BROWNLIE, supra note 23, at 259.
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through all "reasonably peaceful means" available. 44 States must be
able to demonstrate that the force used was strictly limited to
repelling the threat posed and was not driven by offensive,
retaliatory, or other unlawful purposes. 45 Additionally, a defending
state must comply with any applicable international laws and
obligations,
including-most
conspicuously-the
rules
of
international humanitarian law (IHL). 46 Although the standard of
review is not currently well defined, states by and large must
presumably satisfy all three central elements of imminence,
necessity, and proportionality under a "reasonable nation"
standard. 47 The specific or general factors relevant to an evaluation
under that standard remain unclear, but the review would appear to
48
be based on an ex ante (versus ex post) perspective.

III.

CRITERIA FOR FRAMING THE PROPOSED LEGAL STANDARD

The objective of this Part is to develop an analytical model that
identifies and describes the criteria pertinent both to a critique of the
presumptive legal standard governing proactive self-defense and to
the development of a more functional and meaningful standard. The
criteria are organized into four major components reflecting the
standard's priority features-namely, it must (1) possess certain basic
attributes and (2) address current security realities, while (3)

44.
ANTHONY CLARK AREND & ROBERT J. BECK, INTERNATIONAL LAW AND THE
USE OF FORCE 72 (1993).
45.
JENNINGS & WATTS, supranote 39, at 412.
46.
Legality of the Threat or Use of Nuclear Weapons, Advisory Opinion, 1996
I.C.J. 226,
42 (July 8) [hereinafter Nuclear Weapons Opinion]; Louis Ren6 Beres,
Preserving the Third Temple: Israel's Right of Anticipatory Self-Defense Under
InternationalLaw, 26 VAND. J. TRANSNAT'L L. 111, 115 n.l, 147-48 (1993); Sienho
Yee, The Potential Impact of the Possible U.S. Responses to the 9-11 Atrocities on the
Law Regarding the Use of Force and Self-Defence, 1 CHINESE J. INT'L L. 287, 293 (2002).
47.
See McDougal, supra note 26, at 597-98.
In broadest formulation, this right of self-defense, as established by traditional
practice, authorizes a state which being the target of activities by another
state, reasonably decides, as third-party observers may determine
reasonableness, that such activities imminently require it to employ the
military instrument to protect its territorial integrity and political
independence, to use such force as may be necessary and proportionate for
securing its defense.
Id. (emphasis added).
48.
Most commentators appear to prefer the ex ante viewpoint, see infra note
236, but at least one scholar has questioned the legality of Israel's anticipatory strike
in the Six-Day War based on post mortem evidence demonstrating that Egypt and
Syria, contrary to expectations, were in fact not about to launch an attack on Israel.
O'CONNELL, supra note 6, at 9.
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ensuring the legitimacy of international law and (4) diminishing the
prospects of armed conflict.
A. First Component: Possess CertainBasic Attributes
The fundamental attributes of the ideal legal standard are:
clarity, flexibility, comprehensiveness, and objectivity. Each will be
examined in turn.
1.

Clarity

It should be axiomatic that the international community
demands and expects a reasonably clear set of rules governing
proactive self-defense. After all, states need to know under what
specific circumstances they may employ force before suffering an
attack, as well as when others may use proactive defensive force
against them. The rules must also be clear enough that states are
able to implement them without confusion or undue delay. Legal
guidance that is murky or abstract could lead to a heightened risk of
armed
conflict
arising
from
innocent or
even feigned
misunderstanding. 49
Uncertainty could also complicate legal
accountability, as violations would be harder to discern. As Henkin
aptly observed:
In our decentralized international political system with primitive
institutions and underdeveloped law enforcement machinery, it is
important that Charter norms-which go to the heart of international
order and implicate war and peace in the nuclear age-be clear,
sharp ....50

Given the cloudy context of anticipatory self-defense today, many
have clamored for a clearer legal standard. 51 Indeed, the present lack

49.
John Alan Cohan, The Bush Doctrine and the Emerging Norm of
Anticipatory Self-Defense in Customary InternationalLaw, 15 PACE INT'L L. REV. 283,
354-55 (2003). See generally Michael Skopets, Comment, Battered Nation Syndrome:
Relaxing the Imminence Requirement of Self-Defense in InternationalLaw, 55 AM. U. L.
REV. 753, 767 n.69 (2005) ("Because international self-defense laws were not codified,
principles governing self-defense could be, and were, interpreted differently by various
countries and in divergent traditions.").
50.
O'CONNELL, supra note 6, at 16 (emphasis added).
51.
See, e.g., BROWNLIE, supra note 23, at 260 ("The particular fault of the
customary rule is that it provides no clear guidance as to the very rare cases in which
anticipatory acts of force may be justified: even the formula in the Caroline case is
primarily verbal."); Timothy L.H. McCormack, Anticipatory Self-Defence in the
Legislative History of the United Nations Charter, 25 ISR. L. REV. 1, 42 (1991) ('The
efforts of international lawyers now ought to concentrate on clarifying the limits of
anticipatory self-defence .... ); Terence Taylor, The End of Imminence?, WASH. Q.,
Autumn 2004, at 57, 60 ("Because of the nature of current and pending international
security threats, more precision is urgently needed to establish a common
understanding of legally justifiable action in the face of imminent threats ...").
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of clarity is perhaps the greatest defect of the current standard and
provides the major impetus for reform. Uncertainties exist across
virtually all dimensions of the legal standard, ranging from the
question of imminence (e.g., can temporal proximity be imputed from
a series of "pin-prick" attacks?); to proportionality (e.g., can this
principle accommodate repelling not just the immediate threat, but
the overall threat, posed by a given adversary?); to the gravity of the
threat (e.g., how serious must a threat be before a state can
legitimately resort to preemptive force?); and to the standard of
review itself.
Two caveats are in order. First, clarification can backfire and
effectively strip states of their rights if the scope of permissible
conduct is defined too narrowly or, conversely, increase the prospects
of armed conflict if the operative standard is defined too broadly.
Indeed, in response to that specific concern, many states, especially
those with greater capabilities, have historically demonstrated a
5 2
distinct preference for keeping the standard sufficiently ambiguous.
Second, some scholars contend that a clearer standard would only
lead to bickering among states over its precise meaning, so that any
added clarity would inconsequentially shift the debate from one
source of dispute to another. 53
However, at a minimum, the
provisions would impose important outer bounds to be observed, and,
when complemented by a reasonableness test, good faith
expectations, and international scrutiny, states should be less prone
to take impermissible liberties.
2.

Flexibility

Clarity must not, however, be accompanied by rigidity.54 It is
well understood that, in the area of military force and self-defense, a
healthy degree of operational latitude is required.55 Any number of
threat postures (e.g., based on the character, timing, and gravity of
force) may present themselves, including emergent postures based on
new means and methods of warfare.
Such threats are further

52.
Antonio Cassese, Return to Westphalia? Considerations on the Gradual
Erosion of the Charter System, in THE CURRENT LEGAL REGULATION OF THE USE OF
FORCE, supra note 13, at 505, 520; Skopets, supra note 49, at 768.
53.
See Michael J. Glennon, The Fog of Law: Self-Defense, Inherence, and
Incoherence in Article 51 of the United Nations Charter, 25 HARV. J. PUB. L. & POL'Y
539, 558 (2001) ("No advance in the art of legal drafting can bridge the enormous gulf
that divides the international community over what constitutes acceptable use of force.
Any linguistic formula that purported to do so would necessarily consist of a chain of
endlessly contested weasel words.").
54.
Jane E. Stromseth, New Paradigmsfor the Jus Ad Bellum?, 38 GEO. WASH.
INT'L L. REV. 561, 572 (2006).
55.
Indeed, flexibility is a hallmark of proportionality. DINSTEIN, supra note 5,
at 210; WICKER, supra note 35, at 66-67.
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refracted by the perceptual difficulties that almost invariably arise
during periods of mounting tension. Accordingly, the legal standard
governing proactive self-defense must establish guiding principles
that are functional and utilitarian without being too concrete,
constraining, or category-bound. 56 At the same time, flexibility
should not be confused with "open-endedness," which can create
problems of its own. 57 The current standard, for all its looseness in
definition, is perceived by many as still lacking sufficient elasticity,
58
especially with respect to the element of imminence.
3.

Comprehensiveness

The optimal legal framework should consist of a single,
It
overarching standard that satisfies three related objectives.
should: (1) effectively guide the conduct of all states-small and large,
weak and powerful, irresponsible and honorable; 59 (2) accommodate
every conceivable type of armed threat scenario;6 0 and (3) not only
address the substantive elements, but also supply a standard of proof,
procedural safeguards, and a standard of review. If a single standard
can cover all of these dimensions (with proper clarity and adequate
flexibility), it can facilitate states' implementation of proactive selfdefense, thereby minimizing the risk of error, misunderstanding, or
abuse-as there would be only one standard to apply, as opposed to
several. A single, all-encompassing standard can also improve
For these reasons,
accountability for unlawful conduct.

56.
See Gill, supra note 14, at 368 (exhorting against applying the Caroline
factors "as a static checklist or verbal straitjacket"); John Lawrence Hargrove, The
Nicaragua Judgment and the Future of the Law of Force and Self-Defense, 81 AM. J.
INT'L L. 135, 143 (1987) (advocating against a highly technical standard that reads like
a tax code); Amos Shapira, The Six-Day War and the Right of Self-Defence, 6 ISR. L.
REV. 65, 75 (1971) (noting that the subject matter "does not lend itself to rigid
formulae").
57.
See Andrew Garwood-Gowers, Self-Defence Against Terrorism in the Post9/11 World, 4 QUEENSLAND U. L. & JUST. J. 1, 15-17 (2004) (stating that openendedness can lead to military action well beyond meeting the specific need to repel a
threatened attack); Nabati, supra note 11, at 793 (observing that "open-endedness" can
eschew multilateralism and increase the likelihood of war).
E.g., U.K. PARLIAMENT SELECT COMM. ON FOREIGN AFFAIRS, WRITTEN
58.
15
EVIDENCE OF PHILIPPE SANDS: "INTERNATIONAL LAW AND THE USE OF FORCE"
(July 30, 2005) [hereinafter SANDS EVIDENCE], available at http://www.
Charles
publications.parliament.uk/pa/cm2003O4/cmselect/cmfaff/441/4060805.htm;
Pierson, Preemptive Self-Defense in an Age of Weapons of Mass Destruction: Operation
IraqiFreedom, 33 DENV. J. INT'L L. & POL'Y 150, 177 (2004); Polebaum, supra note 11,
at 208.
59.
Oscar Schachter, Self-Defense and the Rule of Law, 83 AM. J. INT'L L. 259,
274 (1989); Svarc, supra note 29, at 189.
60.
Illustrative examples include: (1) cross-border incursions, (2) naval
blockades, (3) computer attacks with severe kinetic effects, (4) a series of "pin-prick"
strikes, and (5) assaults where a state's survival would be at stake.
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comprehensiveness has been acknowledged as a critical variable for a
legal standard. 6 1 It is of great import, however, that this attribute
not be pursued with Procrustean zeal, such that exceptional
circumstances are arbitrarily forced into a one-size-fits-all standard.
4.

Objectivity

The initial decision whether to exercise force in self-defense in a
62
crisis situation must be left, by necessity, to the state under threat;
there is simply no practical alternative, as the Security Council is not
63
well suited to respond with the alacrity required in an emergency.
It is nevertheless critical that states not be given unfettered
discretion and that determinations are ultimately subject to an ex
post facto review for their lawfulness by the international
community.6 4 The problem lies in how to incorporate objectivity into
the decision-making calculus, both for the defending state making the
initial determination and for the international community when it
conducts its review.. Objectivity is desirable because it mitigates

purely instinctual, irrational, or politically self-serving reactions by
imposing a measured set of criteria that satisfy general societal
expectations. Although it is difficult to imagine a more objective (i.e.,
verifiable) standard than that of reactive self-defense, 65 for the
reasons identified below, such a position is largely untenable in
today's world.

61.
O'CONNELL, supra note 6, at 16 (quoting Henkin).
62.
PHILIP C. JESSUP, A MODERN LAW OF NATIONS: AN INTRODUCTION 164
(1948); MALCOLM N. SHAW, INTERNATIONAL LAW 790 (4th ed. 1997).
63.
The Charter drafters proved prescient by providing for states to exercise
their inherent right to self-defense "until the Security Council has taken measures
necessary to maintain international peace and security." U.N. Charter art. 51
(emphasis added).
64.
J.L. BRIERLY, THE LAW OF NATIONS: AN INTRODUCTION TO THE
INTERNATIONAL LAW OF PEACE 296 (4th ed. 1949); see also International Military
Tribunal (Nuremberg), Judgment and Sentences, Oct. 1, 1946, as reported in 41 AM. J.
INT'L L. 172, 207 (1947) (hereinafter IMT/Nuremberg] (applying this doctrine to the
case of the German invasion of Norway in 1940).
65.
Consistent with this view, some favor a legal regime that proscribes, in
principle, any proactive defensive force but would allow an offending state to make its
case to the international community, and, to the extent mitigating circumstances were
found, an appropriately diminished penalty would be exacted. E.g., ANTONIO CASSESE,
INTERNATIONAL LAW 362 (2d ed. 2005). But see Oscar Schachter, The Right of States to
Use Armed Force, 82 MICH. L. REV. 1620, 1634 (1983).
[W]e must recognize that there may well be situations in which the imminence
of an attack is so clear and the danger so great that defensive action is
essential for self-preservation. It does not seem to me that the law should leave
such defense to a decision contra legem [i.e., against the law].
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B. Second Component: Address Current Security Realities
Any meaningful legal standard applicable to the use of force
must account for the military and political realities of the day. As
Cassese has observed: "International law is a realistic legal system.
It takes account of existing power relationships and endeavors to
translate them into legal rules. '66 The three "realities" that the
governing legal standard must address, at a minimum, are: (1) the
nature and destructive capacity of modern weaponry; (2) the reduced
67
time to react to attacks capable of accelerated methods of delivery;
and (3) the proven inability of the Security Council to intervene
68
timely and effectively to avert impending attacks.
1.

Nature and Destructive Capacity of Modern Weaponry

Although technological advances in weaponry, whether in terms
of precision, destructive yield, or character (e.g., "dirty bombs"), have
occurred over the past several decades, the weapons most pertinent to
this inquiry are the so-called weapons of mass destruction (WMD),
which include nuclear, biological, chemical, and radioactive
weapons. 69 The destructive capacity of these weapons, as soberly
witnessed in such locations as Hiroshima 70 and Halabja, 71 is almost

66.
CASSESE, supra note 14, at 26; see also Hofmeister, supra note 11, at 33-38
(commenting that jus ad bellum is "not a static concept"; it has evolved significantly
over the centuries).
67.
See Christopher Greenwood, InternationalLaw and the Pre-emptive Use of
Force: Afghanistan, Al-Qaida, and Iraq, 4 SAN DIEGO. INT'L L.J. 7, 16 (2003) (noting
that the gravity of the threat and the method of delivery of the threat are two nonCaroline factors relevant to determining whether an attack is imminent). Admittedly,
these "realities" do not apply uniformly to all states; they are most germane to the
militarily advanced states. Accordingly, any proposal to reform the legal standard must
accommodate these realities while remaining mindful of the inequality in
circumstances across the international community.
68.
A fourth "reality" is often referenced in this context but, because it
fundamentally concerns non-state actors, will not be discussed here. That "reality" is
the changing character of the "enemy," namely, the emergence of global terrorism. See,
e.g., Michael J. Glennon, Preempting Terrorism: The Case for Anticipatory Self-Defense,
WEEKLY STANDARD, Jan. 28, 2002, available at http://www.weeklystandard.com/
ContentPublic/Articles/000/000/000/810hjeup.asp?pg=2 ("[T]errorist organizations 'of
global reach' were unknown when Article 51 was drafted."); Hofmeister, supra note 11,
at 42 (discussing views on self-defense as it relates to new threats posed by terrorism).
69.
Jack Boureston, Assessing Al Qaeda's WMD Capabilities, STRATEGIC
INSIGHTS, Sept. 2002, http://www.ccc.nps.navy.mil/si/sept02/wmd.asp.
70.
The atomic bomb that exploded over Hiroshima had a relatively low-yield of
13 kilotons (equivalent to 13,000 tons of TNT) but nevertheless resulted in the
immediate deaths of 70,000-130,000 persons. The Atomic Museum, http://www.
atomicmuseum.com/tour/dd2.cfm (last visited Feb. 20, 2009). To put this size into
perspective, the Russian SS-18 missile can carry a single warhead with a capacity of 20
megatons (or the equivalent of 20 million tons of TNT). Defencejournal.com, Evolution
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unimaginably enormous and instantaneous, operating on a level that
the Charter drafters could not have reasonably foreseen. 72 In
73
addition, such weapons have steadily become more widely available.
Concern about the proliferation of WMD and related technologies has
arisen due to, inter alia, the dispersal of the former Soviet Union's
extensive nuclear arsenal beginning in 1989,74 the emergence of a
WMD marketplace 75 with dedicated "buyers" (e.g., "rogue states") and
"sellers" (e.g., the A.Q. Khan network 76), and the dual-use nature of
77
these weapons.
Such significant changes in modern weaponry render the
security, if not the survival, of states increasingly vulnerable, as the
detonation of a single nuclear bomb or introduction of a chemical
agent into a municipal water system could wipe out an entire city
population and wreak untold economic and societal damage. 78 As
Greenwood argues:

of Nuclear Doctrine and the Effects on Conventional Force Structure,
http://defencejournal.com/apr99/evolution-nuclear.htm (last visited Feb. 20, 2009).
71.
Halabja is the Kurdish village in northern Iraq that suffered a chemical
weapons attack in March 1988 on the order of President Saddam Hussein, resulting in
the immediate deaths of at least 5,000 Kurds (and up to 12,000 altogether over a period
of days). Alex Atroushi, Kurdistan Democratic Party, Bloody Friday: Chemical
Massacre of the Kurds by the Iraqi Regime, Halabja-March 1988, http://www.kdp.
pp.se/oldlchemical.html (last visited Feb. 20, 2009).
72.
AREND & BECK, supra note 44, at 38; Lucy Martinez, September 11th, Iraq
and the Doctrine of Anticipatory Self-Defense, 72 U. MO. KAN. CITY L. REV. 123, 159-60
(2003); Mark L. Rockefeller, The "Imminent Threat" Requirement for the Use of
Preemptive Military Force: Is It Time for a Non-Temporal Standard?,33 DENV. J. INT'L
L. & POL'Y 131, 135 (2004).
73.
See Roberts, supra note 8, at 244-45, 253-54 (discussing the resurgence of
terrorism in modern times and an increase in its severity, frequency, and technology
and noting that money, sanctuary, weapons and munitions, intelligence, training, and
technical expertise, are much more readily available to terrorist groups, especially to
state-sponsored terrorist groups).
74.
See Hofmeister, supra note 11, at 47, 47 n.66 (referencing financial
incentives and questionable security in connection with the vast Soviet nuclear
weapons inventory).
75.
Id. at 47.
76.
See GEORGE TENET WITH BILL HARLOW, AT THE CENTER OF THE STORM xvii,
261 (2007) (noting that A.Q. Khan, the father of Pakistan's nuclear program, "built an
international network of suppliers of nuclear capability for sale to rogue states").
77.
Dual-use weapons have both commercial (e.g., energy, medical) and
military applications. Their duality complicates detection efforts.
78.
It is precisely for this reason that some legal commentators argue for
further constraints. They contend that broader state discretion to mount a defensive
strike might result in conflicts that otherwise never would have occurred, and that the
high stakes involved therefore counsel for a more cautionary stance. E.g., HILAIRE
MCCOUBREY & NIGEL D. WHITE, INTERNATIONAL LAW AND ARMED CONFLICT 94 (1992);
Bert V.A. Roling, The Ban on the Use of Force and the U.N. Charter, in THE CURRENT
LEGAL REGULATION OF THE USE OF FORCE, supra note 13, at 3, 6-7; Amy E. Eckert &
Manooher Mofidi, Doctrine or Doctrinaire-The First Strike Doctrine and Preemptive
Self-Defense Under InternationalLaw, 12 TUL. J. INT'L & COMP. L. 117, 140-41 (2004).
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The potentially cataclysmic dimensions of an attack with nuclear,
biological -or chemical weapons makes the threat so disproportionate
to conventional threats that existed in the times of the Caroline case
that it would be suicidal to wait until an attack is visibly underway. 79
Furthermore, such weapons could target and efficiently destroy a
state's military infrastructure and assets (especially if concentrated
among a small number of bases), leaving that state unable to mount
80
an effective defense.
2.

Reduced Time to Respond to Attacks.

The presumed legal standard governing proactive self-defense
dictates that a state may not use force unless the threatened attack is
imminent. This concept assumes that a "time-gap" exists between
the threat posed and the actual attack, during which-if the span is
short enough-a state would be entitled (at least under this singlefactor analysis) to launch a proactive defensive strike.8 '
This
assumes that states have the luxury of knowledge of an impending
attack. It is contended, however, that this assumption is no longer
realistic,82 particularly in light of technological advances that have
enabled weapons, such as ballistic missiles and stealth bombers, to
travel with remarkable speed and secrecy,8 3 coupled with an
increased priority assigned by many to the element of surprise.8 4 To
the extent that the time-gap has vanished for certain types of threats,
states would have no genuine opportunity to satisfy the imminence

79.
Svarc, supra note 29, at 183; see also Glennon, supra note 68 (noting that
with WMD, the "first blow can be devastating-far more devastating than the pinprick
attacks on which the old rules ... were premised").
80.
Martinez, supra note 72, at 159-60.
81.
See Rockefeller, supra note 72, at 139 (using the term "time-gap").
82.
William C. Bradford, "The Duty to Defend Them": A Natural Law
Justification for the Bush Doctrine of Preventive War, 79 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 1365,
1390 (2003); Louis J. Capezzuto, Note, Preemptive Strikes Against Nuclear Terrorists
and Their Sponsors: A Reasonable Solution, 14 N.Y.L. SCH. J. INT'L & COMP. L. 375,
392 (1993). In addition, certain weapons systems complicate the imminence analysis
not on account of their speed and the clandestine quality of their delivery, but instead
due to unique characteristics. See CHRISTINE GRAY, INTERNATIONAL LAW AND THE USE
OF FORCE 108 nn.48-49 (2d ed. 2004) (citing the difficulty of fitting naval mines and
radar-guided missiles into traditional conceptions of self-defense).
83.
Capezzuto, supra note 82, at 392; Vytautas Kacerauskis, Can A Member of
the United Nations UnilaterallyDecide to Use Preemptive Force Against Another State
Without Violating the UN Charter?, 2 INT'L J. BALTIC L. 73, 89 (2005). The increased
speed of these weapons has not compromised their accuracy, given the advent of
sensors and precision-guided systems. Rockefeller, supranote 72, at 136.
84.
Greenwood, supra note 67, at 16; Rockefeller, supra note 72, at 140.
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element, effectively leaving them and their populations helpless in
85
the face of attack.
3.

Proven Inability of Security Council to Timely Intervene

Ideally, a legal standard governing proactive self-defense would
promote an effective multilateral approach for resolving inter-state
As strategist Guoliang put it: "[I]nternational
disputes.
cooperation ...

is the key to international security."8 6

A concern

expressed about granting expanded authority for states to use force in
self-defense is that it would instead foster unilateralism at the
expense of collective security and in contravention of the Charter
regime.8 7 The reality, however, is that the Security Council has not
adequately delivered on its promise to provide "prompt and
effective"88 collective security against aggressor states.8 9 This result
is a product of several interrelated factors, including the failure of
states themselves to enter into the special agreements that would
have given rise to an armed force at the Security Council's disposal
(per Article 43 of the Charter), extensive use of the veto power by the
90
permanent members, paralyzing political and ideological divisions,
and a loss of confidence, especially among Western states, in the
effectiveness of a politicized United Nations to broker a dispute
dispassionately. 9 1 In effect, the bargain struck under the Charter has
been one-sided, with states conceding their right to use force under
Article 2(4) 92-in all but highly restricted circumstances, and then

85.
SANDS EVIDENCE, supra note 58, para. 15. See generally Louis Ren6 Beres,
After the SCUD Attacks: Israel, 'Palestine,' and Anticipatory Self-Defense, 6 EMORY
INT'L L. REV. 71, 103 (1992) ("International law is not a suicide pact.").
86.
Harry S. Laver, Preemption and the Evolution of America's Strategic
Defense, PARAMETERS, Summer 2005, at 107, 116-17, available at http://www.carlisle.
army.mil/usawc/Parameters/05summerflaver.htm.
87.
Eckert & Mofidi, supra note 78, at 150; Greenwood, supra note 67, at 10;
104-106 (describing a preference
see also High-Level Panel Report, supra note 10,
for good communication and preventative deployment of peacekeepers during times of
mounting tensions); Svarc, supra note 29, at 177 (describing the regime as one favoring
collective security in place of unilateral military actions).
88.
This is the standard of action expected of the Security Council in executing
its "primary responsibility for the maintenance of international peace and security."
U.N. Charter art. 24, 1.
89.
WOLFGANG FRIEDMANN, THE CHANGING STRUCTURE OF INTERNATIONAL
LAW 259 (1964); Pierson, supra note 58, at 177; Brunson MacChesney, Some Comments
on the "Quarantine"of Cuba, 57 AM. J. INT'L L. 592, 596 (1963).
90.
Devika Hovell, Chinks in the Armour: International Law, Terrorism and
the Use of Force, 27 U. N.S.W. L.J. 398, 402 (2004). Indeed, even with the Cold War
behind us, fundamental political rifts within the Security Council remain, and it is
certainly conceivable that the Security Council will once again be plagued by either a
set of dueling superpowers or by the opposite problem, intransigent multi-polarity.
AREND & BECK, supra note 44, at 39.
91.
4 ("All Members shall refrain in their
92.
See U.N. Charter art. 2,
international relations from the threat or use of force against the territorial integrity or
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only on a provisional basis per Article 51-in exchange for an
ineffective collective security machinery. 93
A state's discretion to
engage in proactive self-defense can help compensate for this
94
imbalance.
C. Third Component: Ensure Legitimacy of InternationalLaw
Not only must the ideal standard take account of changing
realities in the international security environment, but it must also
embrace requirements perceived as legally feasible or else risk a loss

political independence of any state, or in any other manner inconsistent with the
Purposes of the United Nations.").
93.
Admittedly, the General Assembly is authorized to step in for the Security
Council in moments of such deadlock and inaction. In 1950, during the throes of the
Cold War, the General Assembly passed the Uniting for Peace Resolution, No. 377 (V)
(1950), which allowed it to "recommend collective measures, including the use of armed
force if necessary." GRAY, supra note 82, at 200. The ICJ validated this authority as
consistent with the General Assembly's powers under the Charter. Certain Expenses of
the United Nations (Art. 17, para. 2, of the Charter), Advisory Opinion, 1962 I.C.J. 151,
243 (July 20). For several reasons, however, this authority offers no panacea to the
problem of Security Council inaction. First, the General Assembly, which must contend
with its own ideological factions, requires a supermajority of two-thirds to pass a
resolution for maintenance of international peace and security, which is no mean feat.
U.N. Charter art. 18,
2. Second, in such matters, the General Assembly is not
authorized to pass binding resolutions; thus, it may not enforce compliance by Member
States with its international peace and security-related recommendations. See Certain
Expenses, 1962 I.C.J. at 163, 296 (noting that the role of the General Assembly is
limited to "discussions, petitions, recommendations, and actions of limited scope" and it
is the Security Council that has the actual power to resort to force in order to restore
order). Although the General Assembly could recommend the use of force to an
individual state willing and able to launch a proactive defensive strike, it would be far
more likely, given the time it would take to consult and obtain direction from such an
unwieldy body, that any such recommendation would come only after that state had
suffered a blow. Third, the General Assembly has shown little proclivity in recent
decades to exercise this power (which was last exercised during the Congo crisis in the
1960s). See DINSTEIN, supra note 5, at 316-17 ("[I]n recent years [the General
Assembly] appears to have largely reconciled itself to taking a secondary or silent
role.") (internal quotations omitted).
94.
Combacau, supra note 13, at 32; McDougal, supra note 26, at 597-98; Van
den hole, supra note 23, at 105-06. One commentator advises that Article 51 and
Chapter VII on collective security should operate "correlative[ly]": "The weaker the
Chapter VII collective security system ... the more liberally we should grant the rights
of individual and collective self-defense to nations because the international police force
is not working." Richard N. Gardner, Commentary on the Law of Self-Defense, in LAW
AND FORCE IN THE NEW INTERNATIONAL ORDER 49, 53 (Lori Fisler Damrosch & David

J. Scheffer eds., 1991). Some would prefer to strengthen the UN system itself rather
than to enlarge self-defense rights. That approach, while commendable in principle,
fails to address the fundamentally altered reality that today's weapons and their
delivery capacity have significantly collapsed the time period in which a state may well
need to respond with force. Even under a more efficient and streamlined mechanism,
the window of opportunity for consultation and action, whether by the Security Council
or the General Assembly, simply would not be sufficient under many inter-state
conflict scenarios.
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of legitimacy. The standard must be realistic so that it can be
effectively implemented and enforced; otherwise, it could become
This section is divided into three parts: (1) how
irrelevant. 95
behavioral realism contributes to legal legitimacy; (2) an evaluation of
the extent to which the presumptive legal standard for proactive selfdefense reflects state behavior; and (3) the legitimacy concerns that
may arise from a legal standard that is too accommodating to states'
natural inclinations.
1.

Behavioral Realism in Law Contributes to Its Legitimacy.

"Laws must bear some relation to practice or they cannot
regulate conduct effectively. Laws that impose unrealistic standards
are likely to be violated and ultimately forgotten." 96 This proposition
applies to the UN Charter 97 as well as (perhaps ironically) to
customary rules regulating the use of defensive force. 98 The law
"must permit reasonable responses to those threats [to a nation's
security] in light of the often difficult circumstances in which
decision-makers make tough choices." 99 Otherwise, the law could
become perceived as illegitimate, being so widely flouted as to cause
10 0
the standard itself to fall into desuetude.
More concretely, when a perceived need has arisen, states have
demonstrated an unwillingness to accept at face value certain

95.

The maintenance of world peace and security depends importantly on
there being a common global understanding, and acceptance, of when
the application of force is both legal and legitimate. One of these
elements being satisfied without the other will always weaken the
international legal order ....

High-Level Panel Report, supra note 10, 184 (emphasis added); see also GRIEG, supra
note 40, at 680 ("Unless a rule of international law is based upon the practice of states
or is sufficiently general to fit in with both that practice and the reasonable demands of
states likely to be faced with the need to act, it is probable that it will not be
observed.").
Cohan, supranote 49, at 354.
96.
See Michael C. Bonafede, Note, Here, There, and Everywhere: Assessing the
97.
Proportionality Doctrine and U.S. Uses of Force in Response to Terrorism After the
September 11 Attacks, 88 CORNELL L. REV. 155, 190 (2002) (stating that applying
Article 51 is often much more difficult when addressing international terrorism rather
than the traditional hostile state actor envisioned by the U.N. Charter and calling for
redesign of international legal norms regarding proportional response applying to
international terrorist threats). To its credit, the Charter has proven remarkably agile
in responding to challenges and circumstances not foreseen by its drafters. Stromseth,
supra note 54, at 566.
98.
Hargrove, supra note 56, at 139; John Yoo, Using Force, 71 U. CHI. L. REV.
729, 749-50 (2004).
99.
Stromseth, supra note 54, at 567.
Michael J. Glennon, How InternationalRules Die, 93 GEO. L.J. 939, 942
100.
(2005) (maintaining that desuetude applies to international law and occurs when "a
sufficient number of states join in breaching a rule, causing a new custom to emerge").
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apparent restrictions on their right to use force, such as when they
have undertaken armed interventions to protect nationals and rescue
hostages overseas. 10 1 Such conduct might reflect a diminution in
Article 2(4)'s legitimacy. Further, absent a manifestly lawful basis on
which to justify their use of force, states have been known to rely
upon practices undertaken by others, particularly powerful states,
10 2
even if those precedents are mired in controversy.
2.

Evaluating the Current Standard for its Consonance with Legal
Realism

Although state behavior with respect to proactive self-defense is
far from consistent, the presumed prevailing standard, which is
highly restrictive, is arguably out of sync with the way states actually
reason and behave when faced with imminent threats to their
security. A few examples are illustrative. In 1981, Israeli policy
makers risked international condemnation in order to destroy the
Iraqi Osirak nuclear reactor they suspected was being used to build a
nuclear explosive.' 0 3 Likewise, in 1962, although the United States
relied on Article 52 to justify its naval quarantine around Cuba,
President Kennedy had made clear that the United States "reserved
to itself the ultimate right to take the measures necessary for

101.
Notable examples include: (1) El Salvador's invasion of Honduras on a
claim that its nationals were being persecuted in Honduras (July 1969); (2) the U.S.
attack on Cambodia in connection with the Mayaguez incident (May 1975); and (3) the
Israeli rescue mission of its nationals at the Entebbe Airport in Uganda (June 1976). A.
MARK WEISBURD, THE USE OF FORCE: THE PRACTICE OF STATES SINCE WORLD WAR II
269-70, 274-75, 286-87 (1997).
102.
For example,
South Africa justified its actions [in attacking ANC bases in neighboring
Botswana, Zambia, and Zimbabwe in May 1986] by reference to the position
taken by Western countries against international terrorism.
Citing in
particular the U.S. attack on Libya [the 14 April 1986 air strikes on
installations in Tripoli and Benghazi, Libya], it argued it was entitled to "fight
international terrorism in precisely the same way as other Western
countries .... "
Edward Kwakwa, Incident: South Africa's May 1986 Military Incursions into
NeighboringAfrican States, 12 YALE J. INT'L L. 421, 427 (1987). In addition, in May
2003, when the Indonesian Government launched a military offensive against
separatist rebels in Aceh Province, Indonesian officials "made little secret of their belief
that in the aftermath of the war in Iraq, the United States, as well as other countries,
would be less critical than in the past of the decision to resort to military force." Jane
Perlez, Indonesia Says it Will Press Attacks on Separatists in Sumatra, N.Y. TIMES,
May 23, 2003, at All.
103.
See Skopets, supra note 49, at 771 (defending his government's strike on
the Osirak reactor in 1981, the Israeli Ambassador stated: 'To assert the applicability
of the Caroline principles to a State confronted with the threat of nuclear destruction
would be an emasculation of that State's inherent and natural right of self-defence.").
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national self-preservation." 10 4 More recently, the "Bush Doctrine"
exemplifies a growing interest in a more expansive view of the range
of available responses to address security threats, while states such
as Australia, South Africa, Indonesia, and the United Kingdom,
which have exercised the use of force against non-state actors10 5 in
instances of non-concrete threats, may be similarly inclined vis-h-vis
106
rogue states.
3.

Problems with Rules that are Too Accommodating to Legal
Realism

It would be simplistic, however, to suggest that a legal standard
should be wholly consonant with actual state behavior. Indeed,
questions of legal legitimacy may arise if a legal standard is too
closely aligned with reality (at least to the extent that it is
tantamount to states' natural predilections) such that states might
have broad discretion to act with impunity. In such a case, the
standard could "erode the whole notion of prohibition on the use of
force" 10 7 under Article 2(4) and thereby undermine the legitimacy of
the Charter and, because that instrument underlies the
contemporary international legal fabric, the global rule of law
itself.10 8 Furthermore, if the legal standard merely served as a tool
for the most powerful states-or otherwise failed to provide
meaningful restrictions on state conduct-the very purpose of having
a standard would hardly be realized.

104.
FRIEDMANN, supra note 89, at 260.
105.
See KOLB, supra note 26, at 130-31 ("The pre-emptive [self-defense]
doctrine has in effect already been claimed by such States as Israel, India, Australia
and others, such as Russia and China, albeit in more veiled terms."); supra note 102.
See generally Louis Henkin, Use of Force: Law and U.S. Policy, in RIGHT V. MIGHT:
INTERNATIONAL LAW AND THE USE OF FORCE 37, 142-43 (Louis Henkin et al. eds.,

1989) (discussing the historical tendency of the United States to liberally construe the
Charter's language to allow military intervention it deems in the national interest).
106.

Nor does one prescribe rules for the nation threatened with [an all-out]
attack. If a nation is satisfied that another is about to obliterate it, it
will not wait. But it will have to make that decision on its own
awesome responsibility. Anticipation in that case may have to be
practiced; it need not be preached. The Charter need not make a
principle of it; the law need not authorize or encourage it.

Louis Henkin, Force, Intervention, and Neutrality in Contemporary InternationalLaw,
in INTERNATIONAL LAW: THE STRATEGY OF WORLD ORDER 335, 339 (Richard A. Falk &
Saul H. Mendlovitz eds., 1966).
107.
Eckert & Mofidi, supra note 78, at 140.
108.
THOMAS M. FRANCK, RECOURSE TO FORCE: STATE ACTION AGAINST THREATS
AND ARMED ATTACKS 98 (2002).
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D. Fourth Component: Diminish Prospects of Armed Conflict
Finally, the ideal legal standard governing proactive self-defense
should minimize the chance that tension will devolve into war. The
issue can constructively be posed as follows: Would inter-state armed
conflict be less likely to occur under a more restrictive or a more
expansive reading of the Caroline formula?
Three assessment
vectors-theoretical, empirical, and potential-guide an exploration
of this question.
1.

Theoretical Assessment'0

9

Based on two leading theories of why states go to war, it is
hypothesized that proactive defensive strikes ought to occur with
some frequency. One of these, labeled the "spiral theory," holds that
as tensions mount between two states, each will tend to spin worstcase assumptions, exaggerating the extent of the enemy's hostility
until the perceived immediate threat of an attack by one will
eventually spur the other to strike first. 110
The second theory
maintains that war is more likely to occur when the offensive state is
believed to have an advantage over the defensive state.1 11
A
proactive strike, if properly executed, could effectively destroy at least
some of the opponent's offensive or defensive forces, giving the state
that undertakes the initial strike at least an initial boost in a given
112
conflict.
According to the Correlates of War (COW) Project cited by
113
Reiter, however, these hypotheses offer little predictive value.
That Project examined all military conflicts from 1816 to 1980114
between recognized states involving at least 1,000 combatant
casualties, 115 and defined a strike as "preemptive" if a belief by the

109.

The principal source for this section is Dan Reiter, Exploding the Powder

Keg Myth: Preemptive Wars Almost Never Happen, 20 INT'L SEC. 5 (1995).
110.

Id. at 8.

111.

Id. at 8-9.

112.
See id. at 10 ("A vulnerable military force is one that cannot wait, especially
if it faces an enemy force that is vulnerable if the enemy waits.").
113.
Id. at 13.
114.
Notably, the majority of the time period considered by this study occurred
prior to Charter ratification, when international law had not yet generally prohibited
resort to force. Although some may believe that for this reason the study yields less
meaningful results, the fact remains that states operated under a lower legal threshold
regarding the use of force before October 1945 and therefore would have been more
inclined to exercise proactive self-defense.
115.
Some might challenge the limited scope of this study, as it omits a host of
armed conflicts falling short of "war" and others may question the study's very
definition of "war," as there certainly are armed conflicts which reasonable people
would agree possess all the trappings of a bona fide war but for the fact that they do
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preemptor that it would suffer an attack within sixty days was a
primary motivation. 116 Remarkably, the Project found only three
instances out of sixty-seven total incidents (4.5%) to be preemptive:
the Russo-German interactions in July 1914 (WWI), the Chinese
intervention in the Korean War (in 1950), and the Israeli attack on
Egypt in 1967 (Six-Day War).117 In sum, the Project found that
proactive defensive measures were not a common catalyst in interstate conflicts. 118
This conclusion suggests that granting states
additional latitude in determining to use self-defensive force against
a perceived imminent threat would not necessarily lead to more
warfare.
2.

Empirical Assessment

The analysis now turns to an examination of historical data, not
from the perspective of political science theories of war but from an
empirical evaluation of states' tendency to abide by or abuse legal
limits. Some commentators point out that, absent an effective
enforcement apparatus for state violations of international law, states
have shown a willingness to pursue self-interested purposes on
pretextual self-defense grounds when the opportunity arises. 119 They
cite, for example, the 1948 Pakistani incursion into Kashmir, the
1956 Suez Crisis, and Hitler's attack on the Soviet Union during
World War II (Operation Barbarosa). 120
Perhaps surprisingly,
however, there is a more compelling empirical case for states choosing
12 1
not to behave proactively.
While one might surmise that it is primarily smaller or weaker
states that exercise such self-restraint, as a function of a perceived
power imbalance or unacceptable military risk, even stronger states
have demonstrated such forbearance. The United States and Israel,
among others, have been willing to forego or postpone hostilities
because of perceived political benefits or costs, 12 2 whether a function
of seeking political credibility and stature (domestically or

not meet the requisite number of casualties (e.g., the Falkland Islands or Islas
Malvinas "War").
116.
Reiter, supra note 109, at 13.
117.
Id. at 13-14.
118.
Id. at 13, 25.
119.
See W. Michael Reisman, International Legal Responses to Terrorism, 22
Hous. J. INVL L. 3, 17 (1999) (acknowledging the potential for abuse).
120.
McDOUGAL & FELICIANO, supra note 7, at 210-11 & n.196; Rivkin et al.,
supra note 26, at 468.
121.
As Reiter concluded in his study, "It takes a lot to provoke a state to
preempt." Reiter, supra note 109, at 34.
122.
Id. at 25-28.
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internationally), avoiding international condemnation,12 3 securing
the loyalty of a critical ally, or even hoping to deny third-party
support to an adversary. Reiter cites the following post-Charter
examples: (1) Israel's postponing a proactive strike both in the
context of the Six-Day War and the Yom Kippur War (in October
1973) so as not to put its close relations with the United States in
jeopardy; (2) Egypt's decision against a first strike in the Six-Day
War upon belief that, if Israel were perceived as the aggressor, the
United States would withhold assistance to Israel; and (3) U.S.
Attorney General Robert Kennedy's persuasion of his brother,
President John F. Kennedy, that a surprise attack against Cuba in
connection with the Cuban Missile Crisis would impose too high a
124
political cost on the United States.
States also have exercised considerable restraint and
demonstrated risk-aversion during periods of tension by taking
measures specifically designed to alleviate an adversary's concern
about an impending attack. 125 Examples include two occasions
during the Cuban Missile Crisis: the United States allowed a tanker
to pass through the naval quarantine in order to give Soviet Premier
Khrushchev more time to consider his options, and the Soviets, for
their part, refrained from making preparations for general war so as
not to provoke a U.S. preemptive action. 12 6 Such decisions to desist
from the exercise of force in self-defense, however, are not always
1
cost-free. 27

3.

Potentiality Assessment

In assessing whether an expanded Caroline standard would
diminish the prospects of war, we must not only understand the
empirical evidence but also consider states' capability to ascertain
their adversaries' true intentions and predict with accuracy whether

123.

[States] strongly object to [international] condemnation and will make
determined efforts to forestall censure by the U.N. That they do so
shows that a condemnation of illegality by an international organ, even
if not binding, is regarded as detrimental, imposing political costs on
the offender . . . .

Thus, we can plausibly infer that governments

consider the possibility of such censure when they face a decision to use
force.
Schachter, supra note 18, at 123. Such concern would only be amplified under a clearer
standard governing proactive self-defense, as then the international community would
be more focused on and generally aware of the permissible limits.
124.
Reiter, supra note 109, at 25-26.
125.
Id. at 28-32.
126.
Id. at 29, 31.
127.
The downside of not taking proactive defensive measures has been
demonstrated in such cases as the October 1973 Yom Kippur War (Israel) and the
August 1990 Iraqi invasion of Kuwait (Kuwait). Beres, supranote 85, at 78.
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an attack is forthcoming. If states possess the requisite intelligence
collection and analytical capacity to make such determinations, this
would favor affording states greater operational leeway in selfdefense; if not, an additional constraint would be in order, such as a
more demanding evidentiary standard. Proponents of a broader
standard claim that states are, in fact, fully equipped to make
accurate determinations based on "modern methods of intelligence
collection, such as satellite imagery and communication intercepts"
and, therefore, they need not "await convincing proof of a state's
128
hostile intent."
There is, however, considerable skepticism that global
intelligence capabilities can perform at a high enough level to
consistently make the right call.
To begin, intelligence is an
imprecise science that is largely based on expert analysis of a mix of
direct, indirect, and circumstantial data, only some of which is
verifiable. Authoritative information is not typically available to the
intended target state in armed conflict situations, and, therefore,
predictions about an enemy's intentions are frequently inconclusive.
Such determinations are complicated by "denial and deception"
techniques used to throw off data collectors 129 and human sources
who may share fabricated information. 130 Even with the benefit of
sophisticated technological means, generally reliable human
l3 l
intelligence sources, and cooperative foreign intelligence services,
states are left to their best judgment and are most often unable to
132
predict events (including attacks) with a high degree of certainty.
There have, in fact, been some glaring historical failures to
foresee even major conventional attacks by states with some of the
world's most advanced intelligence capabilities. 133
Accordingly,

128.
Cohan, supra note 49, at 320.
129.
See TENET, supra note 76, at 328 (describing "Iraq's extensive efforts to
conceal illicit procurement of proscribed components").
130.
See id. at 375-83 (discussing a source code-named "Curve Ball" who
provided false intelligence on "mobile biological production trailers" in Iraq in 2000).
131.
See id. at 125 (citing example of Jordanian intelligence chief sharing
information with the CIA).
132.
See Nabati, supra note 11, at 798 ("[I]n an age of weapons of instant
destruction and concealed terrorist networks, it is hard-despite sophisticated
intelligence capabilities-to establish with certainty when a terrorist attack is
imminent."); Rivkin et al., supra note 26, at 484 (noting that it is very difficult to tell
whether an attack is unavoidable; even with the most reliable intelligence estimates, it
could be simply a show of force or preparations to negotiate from a position of
strength).
133.
E.g., Istvan Pogany, Nuclear Weapons and Self-Defense in International
Law, 2 CONN. J. INT'L L. 97, 105 (1986) (noting Israel's failure to predict Arab invasions
to commence the 1973 Yom Kippur War, the UK's failure to anticipate Argentina's
seizure of the Falklands/Malvinas in 1982, and the United States' failure to foresee the
Soviet invasion of Czechoslovakia in 1968). However, to be sure, these events occurred
decades ago and there is every reason to believe intelligence capabilities across the
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detecting an imminent nuclear or biological weapons strike with a
high level of confidence would be considerably more difficult. 1 34 A
fortiori, states with inferior intelligence collection means and
analytical acumen would be less able to predict accurately the
likelihood and timing of a possible attack. The concern, of course, is
that miscalculation could push states into unnecessary armed
conflict. 135 Thus, when devising a legal standard to govern proactive
self-defense, the evidentiary standard must be set sufficiently high to
match the challenges states face in being able to consistently identify
and render accurate assessments of threats to their security.

IV.

METHODOLOGICAL CONSIDERATIONS

Having identified a baseline standard and developed evaluative
criteria, this Part seeks to address those key methodological
considerations that have a bearing on the formulation of the reform
proposal.
First, the proposal constitutes more of an analytical framework
than a detailed set of rules. The nature of self-defense and the use of
force-given the vast range of possible threat scenarios, historical
relationships between opposing states, and the various types of
weapons, geographical contexts, tactics, and leadership profiles
involved, among other factors-precludes a simple set of enumerated
requirements. 1 36 At the same time, however, in the guise of an
analytical framework, the proposal not only takes account of the
substantive elements, such as necessity and proportionality, but also

board have improved markedly in the intervening years-although so have states'
abilities to conceal their military plans and activities.
134. Id. at 106.
135.
Chris Bordelon, The Illegality of the U.S. Policy of Preemptive Self-Defense
Under InternationalLaw, 9 CHAP. L. REV. 111, 137 (2005); Svarc, supranote 29, at 185.
In a sense this Article has adopted the "living document" approach as
136.
embodied in the UN Charter. A British delegate to the San Francisco Conference
characterized this approach in the United Nations context as follows:
[I]nstead of trying to govern the actions of the members and the organs of the
United Nations by precise and intricate codes of procedure, we have preferred
to lay down purposes and principles under which they are to act. And by that
means, we hope to insure that they act in conformity with the express desires
of the nations assembled here, while, at the same time, we give them freedom
to accommodate their actions to circumstances which today no man can
We do not want to lay down rules.which may, in the future, be the
foresee ....
signpost for the guilty and a trap for the innocent.
Stromseth, supra note 54, at 563 (quoting Lord Halifax, Verbatim Minutes of First
Meeting of Commission I, June 14, 1945, U.N. Conference on Int'l Organization:
Selected Documents, 529, 537, U.N. Doc. 1006 (June 15, 1945)).
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postulates a relevant evidentiary standard, procedural safeguards
and a standard of review.
Second, the proposal seeks to embody the criteria set forth in
Part III. Accordingly, the standard strives to avoid vagueness, ensure
broad material application, and permit accountability for violations
based on international community scrutiny. In addition, as the legal
standard should apply to all states equally, including the least
responsible, the guidance must not be susceptible to easy
circumvention or abuse. Furthermore, the proposal is intended to
address the full range of possible threat scenarios, whether a pinprick strike or state survival itself is at stake.
Third, the proposal was not conceptualized with the Caroline
standard or Article 51 of the Charter as a baseline; rather, it was
approached as a "blue sky" exercise mindful only that the standard
did not deviate from the fundamental tenets of international law.
Additionally, the approach taken was not confined to seeking a
standard specifically for anticipatory self-defense or preemptive selfdefense, but rather one for proactive self-defense writ large.
Fourth, in contrast to most proposals that identify a set of
requirements to be met, this proposal adopts an operational posture
vis-a-vis the substantive elements of the standard. Thus, rather than
setting forth the applicable criteria in static form, this proposal offers
a dynamic approach that addresses the elements in the same logical
order a state would employ when presented with an actual "use of
force" decision.

V. PROPOSAL FOR REFORM

A. Substantive Elements
From an operational perspective, there are three discrete,
essentially sequential steps for states deciding when and how to
exercise proactive self-defense: (1) gauging the threat posed; (2)
exhausting peaceful means of dispute resolution; and (3) responding
to the threat. These three steps and their corresponding factors
comprise the substantive portion of this proposal.
1.

Gauging the Threat

When contemplating the use of proactive self-defense, a state
must first evaluate the overall criticality of the threat posed-in
particular, its nature and scale, likelihood, and timing.
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i. Nature and Scale. A state must assess the character and
magnitude of the perceived threat, 137 including, for example, the kind
of weapons that might be used by the enemy (e.g., artillery, missiles,
WMD) and their level of sophistication (e.g., Cold War-era munitions
or cutting-edge technology); the size and competence of the armed
force to be engaged (if any); whether it is expected to be an isolated
assault, a medium-scale attack, or a massive onslaught; whether the
attack is to be prosecuted with or without warning and with or
without allied assistance; the likely targets of the attack; and the
anticipated impact of the attack on the defending state's military
force structure, its economy and infrastructure, and its civilian
population. In estimating the outcome, the target state also must
assess the ongoing effectiveness of its own defensive military
capabilities.
A preliminary question to resolve is whether there is some
minimal threshold for the nature and scale of an attack before selfdefense can be lawfully exercised at all. The International Court of
Justice (ICJ) in the Nicaragua Case established that a certain level of
"gravity" was required, effectively ruling out low-level warfare. 138
While its ruling made clear that the mere provision of weapons,
frontier incidents, the boarding of flagged vessels, or the equivalent
would not qualify as an "armed attack" (as required to trigger the
right of self-defense), the Court's opinion left some room for
interpretation and, in any event, has been the subject of considerable
139
criticism.

137.
W. Michael Reisman, Assessing Claims to Revise the Laws of War, 97 AM. J.
INT'L L. 82, 88 (2003); Sofaer, supra note 10, at 220; Svarc, supranote 29, at 184.
138.
See Military and Paramilitary Activities (Nicar. v. U.S.), 1986 I.C.J. 14,
195 (June 27). In effect, the Court distinguished between "the most grave forms of
use of force" (those that rise to the level of armed attack) and "less grave forms" (those
that do not). Id.
191; Natalino Ronzitti, The Expanding Law of Self-Defense, 11 J.
CONFLICT & SEC. L. 343, 351 (2006). As one commentator observed, the Court imposed
a "grave harm" limitation on the scope of "armed attack" and permitted self-defense
only in cases where an attack has a traditional military character and causes a
significant amount of harm. Gregory E. Maggs, The Campaign to Restrict the Right to

Respond to Terrorist Attacks in Self-Defense Under Article 51 of the U.N. Charter and
What the United States Can Do About It, 4 REGENT J. INT'L L. 149, 155 (2006).
139.
Critics have noted that neither the Charter nor collective self-defense
treaties impose a condition of gravity to determine whether an "armed attack" has
occurred, and that while gravity of the attack may be relevant to the proportionality
analysis (i.e., how one responds defensively), it should have no effect on whether selfdefense itself is permissible under such circumstances. See, e.g., Military and
ParamilitaryActivities, 1986 I.C.J. at 543 (cautioning against construing Article 51's
"armed attack" requirement too strictly to limit it to direct attacks by official state
forces and observing that provision of arms to rebels coupled with other kinds of
involvement, like providing logistical or other support, could amount to "armed
conflict") (dissenting opinion of Judge Jennings); CHATHAM HOUSE PRINCIPLES, supra
note 17, at 6 ("An armed attack means any use of armed force, and does not need to
cross some threshold of intensity.").
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There appear to be two general approaches available: 140 setting
either a relatively high or a relatively low threshold. A high
threshold would likely require a threat of "substantial magnitude" or
one that entails "very serious consequences" or the like, below which
no defensive force could be initiated. 14 1 A low threshold might consist
of at least a de minimis142 threat requirement, one understood to be
of limited overall impact. The idea underlying the latter approach
would be to ensure that any actual or perceived use of force beyond
some superficial level would permit the targeted state to respond with
defensive force. 14 3 In either case, a determination would need to be
made as to whether the threshold was crossed. Relevant factors
would likely include the number of combatants and destructiveness of
weapons involved, the extent of human injury or physical damage
likely to occur, and the geographical scope and expected duration of
any military operations.
The de minimis threshold option is preferred for the following
reasons: (1) a high threshold would be harder to ascertain and apply
in practice under this multi-variable calculation and would likely
create confusion and uncertainty in its implementation; (2) a high
threshold might have the perverse consequence of effectively
fostering low-intensity assaults, as aggressor states might feel at
liberty to exercise such force with the reasonable expectation that
defending states, lacking legal sanction, would forego an armed

140.
A third, more radical approach would permit the exercise of the inherent
right of self-defense under any scenario in which a state perceived its security to be
endangered, so long as its response is proportionate to the threat posed. Even if legally
tenable, however, this approach would seem destabilizing and far more likely to result
in hostilities.
See, e.g., CASSESE, supra note 65, at 362 (proposing the existence of a
141.
"massive" threat, "such as [one] seriously to jeopardize the population or even imperil
the life or survival of the State").
142.
The complete term is "de minimis non curat lex." It is defined as "[t]he law
does not concern itself with trifles." BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 464 (8th ed. 2004).
143.
There is one important exception to this rule: when the initial de minimis
force is reasonably perceived to be an integral part of a larger armed engagement that
does or likely would exceed the de minimis threshold. This exception would frequently
be implicated in the context of pin-prick strikes. One cannot say in the abstract
whether an individual pin-prick assault itself necessarily would exceed the de minimis
threshold for the gravity of force; however, taken together as part of a series, there is a
much higher probability. See DINSTEIN, supra note 5, at 202 ("A persuasive argument
can be made that, should a distinctive pattern of behaviour emerge, a series of pinprick assaults might be weighed in its totality and count as an armed attack."); accord
Ronzitti, supra note 138, at 351 (leaving open-ended the question whether a string of
frontier incidents might cumulatively qualify as an "armed attack"). Therefore, the
specific degree of force used in a given pin-prick strike, if part of a larger cycle or
pattern of violence by the same source, should not itself necessarily be a bar to the
exercise of self-defense. The question of the severity of that defensive force is a separate
matter and is addressed as a function of the proportionality element infra Part V.D.3.
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response; 144 (3) a low threshold is more consonant with the
fundamental notion that self-defense is an inherent right; (4) a low
threshold would still preclude self-defensive force in relatively
innocuous situations that are most readily amenable to peaceful
resolution; and (5) a number of precedents exist under domestic law
for applying de minimis standards or rules that have been found
145
highly beneficial.
ii. Likelihood.
A second element for consideration is the
probability that, barring a proactive defensive strike, the threat
would be realized. 146 This determination should be based primarily
on the perceived intent and capabilities of the presumed aggressor
state. 147 More concretely, numerous specific questions should be
considered: Has the presumed aggressor publicly expressed its will to
attack or has intelligence confirmed as much? Has it arrayed or
deployed forces such that they are poised to attack? What lessons can
be gleaned based on historical experience and what insights can be
gained from the leadership profile of the enemy? Does the presumed
aggressor have vital national interests or powerful domestic political
concerns that might make it more likely to attack? What is the
status of any ongoing negotiations between the states at issue, and
has the United Nations, any military pact, or a global or regional
power expressed a willingness to intervene? What is the presumed
aggressor's overall technical competence, and does it believe it has
the military strength sufficient to achieve its objectives? In this
latter respect, the defending state also must take into account its own
148
military capabilities, especially if a deterrent force structure exists.

144.
See W. Michael Reisman, Allocating Competences to Use Coercion in the
Post Cold War World: Practices, Conditions, and Prospects, in LAW AND FORCE IN THE
NEW INTERNATIONAL ORDER 26, 39-40 (Lori Fisler Damrosch & David Scheffer eds.,
1991) (noting that if a state responds to low-level activities with its own counter-force,
the action itself may be considered in violation of international law, and explaining
that states which have been extraterritorial targets of low-level attacks have sought to
establish a norm allowing them to address the source of the offending activity with
physical intervention).
145.
See De Minimis Emission Levels for General Conformity Applicability, 71
Fed. Reg. 136 (July 17, 2006) (applying de minimis standards to control levels of
particular environmental pollutants under the Clean Air Act); John N. Ohlweiler, De
Minimis Conditions of Employment: Must Management Always Bargain?, ARMY LAW.
(Nov. 2004), available at http://findarticles.com/p/articles/mi-m6052/is_2004_Nov/
ain10299132/pg_5 (describing an emergence of a de minimis standard allowing
management in federal employment to make minor managerial changes to employment
conditions without bargaining with the union under certain circumstances).
146.
Sofaer, supra note 10, at 220.
147.
O'BRIEN, supra note 10, at 132-33; Glennon, supra note 53, at 552-53;
Svarc, supra note 29, at 184.
148.
Whether deterrence is premised on nuclear or conventional forces, the
principle is the same: states generally are disinclined to attack if they can expect to
suffer unacceptable losses in retaliation.
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The likelihood determination will depend largely on its access to, and
the credibility of, available intelligence.
Rather than select a standard based on a probability (e.g.,
"reasonable certainty" or "highly probable"), 149 an operational
assessment is preferred, specifically one in which the decision to
attack has become "effectively irrevocable. 1 50 Under this standard,
the question regarding the attack is fundamentally not "if' but
"when"-the uncertainty lies in whether the attack will occur sooner
rather than later. This standard sets an appropriately high threshold
for the likelihood element and comfortably satisfies the principle of
necessity. Notably, this standard implies nothing about the temporal
imminence of the attack (although irrevocability typically tends to be
found close to the time of attack), and the passage of time generally
should not materially affect the calculation.
It is acknowledged that "effective irrevocability" could prove to
be a difficult determination that may require particularly wellsourced intelligence. Although it may occasionally turn out that,
despite compelling evidence, the perceived aggressor state had been
only posturing, 151 no legal system can demand perfection, and this
standard would at least actively signal intolerance for any
significantly militaristic, provocative, or war-mongering measures.
One would be hard-pressed to justify a less demanding test (e.g.,
a "reasonable likelihood" standard) because such a threshold would
be more apt to result in the unnecessary exercise of "defensive" force.
At the same time, it would be imprudent to impose a benchmark as
high as "absolute certainty," given both the practical realities of
obtaining such dispositive intelligence and the unwillingness of states
to stand by while an enemy takes actions that clearly appear
preparatory for an attack but whose motives could not be sufficiently
verified. It must be conceded, however, that no legal threshold is
entirely impervious to an erroneous calculation. Even if the evidence
of an imminent attack appeared virtually iron-clad, any number of
circumstances might arise at the eleventh hour-technological
malfunction, change of strategy, or simply failure of nerve-that

See, e.g., Sofaer, supra note 10, at 221 (suggesting that a "very likely"
149.
determination of a threat materializing should be used).
See CHATHAM HOUSE PRINCIPLES, supra note 17, at 8 (relying on the
150.
concept of irreversibility); Hofmeister, supra note 11, at 45-47 (calling for "irrevocable
commitment").
It has been suggested this may have been the case with Egypt immediately
151.
prior to the Six-Day War. DINSTEIN, supra note 5, at 192; John Quigley, The United
Nations Action Against Iraq: A Precedent for Israel'sArab Territories?,2 DUKE J. COMP.
& INT'L L. 195, 203-13 (1992).
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would result in a state backing down from an intended attack. 152
Indeed, there is historical precedent for such behavior. 153
iii. Timing. Closely linked to the likelihood of an attack is the
third factor in sizing up the threat-urgency. The anticipated timing
of an attack will not only determine whether an opportunity remains
to resolve the dispute through peaceful means, but also whether a
state can avoid speculative defensive actions. 154 Practically speaking,
there are three major approaches to erecting a standard with regard
to urgency: (1) insisting on the current requirement of temporal
imminence; (2) allowing the exercise of self-defense once an
essentially "coherent" threat has coalesced; 155 or (3) mandating a
"last window of opportunity" standard for armed engagement. 156
The "last window of opportunity" logic supposes that a present
danger (i.e., a specific attack threat) is known and that any additional
delay in acting would "seriously compromise security."'157 Because
the underlying rationale of the imminence requirement is to ensure
military action is truly necessary, 158 a "last window" approach should
be no less suitable, as it similarly minimizes the risk of premature
force and reflects the absence of any effective alternative. 159 This
approach also arguably comports with the international human rights
law standard governing the use of force. 160

152.
See BROWNLIE, supra note 24, at 259 ("[E]ven if a state is preparing an
attack it still has a locus poenitentiae [an opportunity to change one's mind] prior to
launching its forces against the territory of the intended victim.").
153.
See Rivkin et al., supra note 26, at 484 (citing the 1909 Austrian
Annexation of Bosnia-Herzegovinia and the 1911 "Agadir Crisis" prior to World War I).
154.
Svarc, supra note 29, at 184.
155.
See Bradford, supra note 82, at 1396 (describing options).
156.
This Author avoids the term "last clear chance" that is sometimes used
interchangeably with "last window of opportunity" (e.g., Martinez, supra note 72, at
171) because, although the phrase conveys the same meaning, the term "last clear
chance" has a specific doctrinal significance that permits recovery by a plaintiff in a
civil lawsuit when he would otherwise be barred based on his or her contributory
negligence, see Bence v. Teddy's Taxi, 297 P. 128, 130 (Cal. Dist. Ct. App. 1931), and to
that extent could prove misleading.
157.
Polebaum, supra note 11, at 211.
158.
See Rockefeller, supra note 72, at 142 ("The requirement of imminence is
meant to assure the necessity of an act.").
159.
See Rex J. Zedalis, Preliminary Thoughts on Some Unresolved Questions
Involving the Law of Anticipatory Self-Defense, 19 CASE W. RES. J. INT'L L. 129, 146
(1987) (stating that for defensive force to be justified, there must be a threat "leaving
no moment for deliberation," but noting that a rule allowing resort to anticipatory force
in response to an existing imminent threat of attack reduces the likelihood that such
force will be mistakenly used).
160.
See Eighth U.N. Congress on Prevention of Crime and Treatment of
Offenders, Havana, Cuba, Aug. 27-Sept. 7, 1990, Basic Principleson the Use of Force
and Firearmsby Law Enforcement Officials, princ. 4 (implying a 'last window" logic by
virtue of making no reference to imminence: "Law enforcement officials . . . may use
force and firearms only if other means remain ineffective or without any promise of
achieving the intended result."); accord David Kretzmer, Targeted Killing of Suspected
Terrorists: Extra-JudicialExecutions or Legitimate Means of Defense?, 16 EUR. J. INT'L
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To see how this "last window" approach would apply in a realworld situation, consider Israel's 1981 strike on Iraq's nuclear
reactor. 1 1 Putting aside for the moment the requisite standard of
proof,162 if Israel could show that: (1) Iraq was devising a nuclear
weapon rather than merely gearing up for commercial power
generation at the Osirak facility; (2) the weapons fabrication effort
was reasonably close to completion; and (3) Iraq had concrete plans or
genuine intentions (rather than spouting mere grandstanding
rhetoric) to strike Israel with a nuclear weapon once acquired, Israel
would have a colorable case to strike under the "last window"
construction of likelihood. In that instance, waiting any longer to
destroy the facility would only increase the risks to the Iraqi civilian
population (given the greater radioactive dissemination that would
ensue from a delayed military campaign targeting the reactor), and
once the weapon was produced, it could be stored in any number of
possible locations or deployed on any one of multiple missiles or
bombers, rendering its later neutralization infinitely more difficult.
Given the operative facts in that case, the first two propositions
appear entirely tenable, though the third remains more open to
163
question.
Temporal imminence provides a less satisfactory benchmark. To
begin, a time-gap does not always exist; that is, attack preparations
are not always apparent to the targeted state, especially given the
speed and secrecy with which weapons can be delivered. 164 There
also may be a certainty (or near-certainty) that at some undisclosed
time and place, but not necessarily imminently, an attack will occur
based on the "on-going, intermittent or cyclical nature of the danger

L. 171, 182 (2005) (describing a viable approach under human rights law that would
enable law enforcement officers to target and kill terrorists where "the unlawful
violence [for which the terrorists would be responsible] might not be imminent, but the
need to use lethal force in order to prevent that violence might be immediate, since if
such force is not used now it may not be possible to prevent the violence later").
See supra text accompanying note 103.
161.
See discussion infra Part V.A.I.v.
162.
Among the factors militating against Israel regarding this third variable
163.
would be: (1) the paradoxical nature of nuclear weapons that renders their awesome
power less useful as an offensive force than as a deterrent, as evidenced by its
categorical non-use by nuclear states over the past six decades, and (2) the need for
Saddam Hussein to have weighed the heavy risk to Iraq of a potentially devastating
retaliatory Israeli nuclear strike, based on a widely held understanding that Israel
possessed a large store of nuclear weapons, notwithstanding its lack of any official
confirmation to that effect. See Michael Ottenberg, Estimating Israel's Nuclear
Capabilities,30 COMMAND 1, 6-8 (1994) (estimating that in 1980 Israel may have had
200 nuclear weapons).
See discussion at Part III.B.2 supra. Temporal imminence, as grounded in
164.
the Caroline standard, arose at a time when the nature of warfare was vastly different;
there were neither instantaneously destructive weapons like WMD nor missiles that
could deliver them without adequate warning. BROWNLIE, supra note 23, at 368; Yoo,
supra note 98, at 750.
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and manifested through previous acts or statements of intent." 165 In
other instances, a time-gap might exist, but the circumstances might
not realistically permit a defending state to wait until the threat has
become imminent. 16 6 Further, if waiting for a threat to become
imminent means holding off until a state cannot effectively defend
itself, then it is left with the unacceptable alternative of suffering the
167
first blow.
At the same time, a mere "coherent" threat standard would be an
inappropriate-and potentially more unstable-basis for gauging
urgency. This approach is dangerously comparable to the concept of
"preventive war," where decision making turns entirely on
speculation and assumptions. War could commence on the precarious
basis of what might happen, rather than on what is highly likely or
almost certain to occur. Even Otto von Bismarck opposed the idea of
preventive war on the grounds that one "can never anticipate the way
of divine providence securely enough for that."168
Errors and
miscalculations could run rampant, states could more easily rely on
this tenuous standard to justify the use of force on pretextual
grounds, and it would be harder to identify violators.
Factors that should be taken into account in ascertaining the
timing of a threatened attack include: (1) the nature and extent of
military developments or location of military deployments by the
presumed aggressor; (2) the political rhetoric or public expressions of
intent by the presumed aggressor; (3) the capability of the presumed
aggressor to mount the type of attack anticipated; (4) the status of
diplomatic negotiations (if any) between the presumed aggressor and
the target state; and (5) the geographical distance the attack would

165.
Rockefeller, supra note 72, at 144.
166.
See Taylor, supra note 51, at 68 ("[A] potential attack may be overwhelming
but not be potentially 'instant' and, given the more lethal threats today, justify the use
of [proactive] self-defense.").
167.
Kacerauskis, supra note 83, at 89; see also Rockefeller, supra note 72, at
139 (discussing the problem of temporal imminence through the "Sailor's Dilemma," a
hypothetical developed by Prof. Paul Robinson).
A slow leak is found by a crew of a seagoing vessel shortly after the ship leaves
port for a long journey to a remote part of the ocean. The ship's Captain
refuses to heed to the crew's pleadings to cancel the journey. The slow leak will
take two days to sink the ship; thus, it poses no immediate risk. However,
absent intervention, the leak poses a definite and certain future risk of sinking
the ship. The dilemma: may the sailors mutiny to gain control of the ship now,
while they are still close to shore and the chances of survival are high, or must
the crew wait until the sinking is temporally imminent (immediate), even if
waiting means they will be farther away from the shore and will have a
decreased chance of survival?
Rockefeller, supra note 72, at 139 (emphasis in original).
168.

Laver, supra note 86, at 113-14.
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cover, based on the location of the assets to be employed and the
likely targets.
iv. Summary of Key Indicators. It should be clear at this point
that any realistic formula for gauging the threat of an attack would
have to account for an enormous breadth of possible permutations.
Compiled into a short checklist, the most critical factors required for
evaluating a threat of attack, filtered through the reliability quotient
of a state's available intelligence, would include:
" Character, method, and consequences of the presumed attack
(including the nature and extent of any military
developments and deployments, whether the strike is to be
delivered with or without warning, whether any military
allies will assist the presumed aggressor, the type of
weaponry to be used, whether state survival is at stake, and
what human, infrastructural, economic, and military
ramifications can reasonably be expected from an attack);
" Intent of the presumed attacker (including its current
rhetoric, any ideological tensions that might exist, profiles of
its military and political leaders, its internal pressures and
national interests, and the extent and recency of any relevant
hostilities to date);
" Capacity and the time available to mount an effective defense
(including the geographical distance from the presumed
attacker, the existence of any deterrent capability, and the
anticipated assistance of any military allies); and
" Nature and extent of any reaction to the situation by the
international community (including, most notably, the UN
Security Council or General Assembly, a collective security
organization, or a global or regional power).
v. Evidentiary Standard. It is now necessary to determine the
level of evidence required to demonstrate the existence of a genuine
security threat, or what is referred to herein as a "serious and urgent
need."'1 69 The evidentiary standard addresses the nature, quality,
and reliability of a state's information about the underlying facts and
circumstances that have led it to decide to act against a given
threat. 170 Five interrelated questions arise in this context: (1) What
is the basic philosophy governing the evidentiary standard? (2) Is
there a useful precedent to draw upon from the civil or criminal law
tradition? (3) Which standard ultimately is most appropriate in this

169.
This phrase was selected as it captures the three fundamental elements
required to trigger self-defensive force: seriousness, urgency, and necessity while
dispensing with the inflexible Caroline notion of temporal imminence.
The "evidentiary standard" differs from the "standard of review" (discussed
170.
infra) in that the former relates to the threshold of proof for the existence of a threat to
justify a state's decision to act, while the latter relates to an ex post evaluation by the
international community of the lawfulness of the conduct undertaken by that state.
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context? (4) What should be the scope of application of that standard?
(5) Should any presumptions be introduced and, if so, in whose favor?
a.
Basic Philosophy. The evidentiary standard should
impose a heavy burden on the defending state, particularly in light of
the high stakes involved and the diminished opportunity a high
burden would present for miscalculation or pretextual strikes. This
point is reinforced by the aforementioned concerns about the
capability of global intelligence services at all levels of sophistication
to consistently ascertain and accurately assess threat information. At
the same time, in a world that assigns such a high premium to
secrecy, deception, and surprise in its military engagements, the
171
standard must not be set impractically high.
b.
Finding Precedent in Civil or Criminal Law. It is
more sensible to look to civil law than to criminal law (within the
common law tradition) for the appropriate standard. Use of force is
not a matter that entails investigating crimes by law enforcement
officers or holding states criminally liable. 172 Thus, criminal law
standards are inapposite. 173 In addition, criminal law standards,
such as reasonable suspicion, probable cause, and reasonable doubt,
are cast in terms of confidence levels, whereas the civil law
standards, such as "preponderance of the evidence" and "clear and
compelling evidence" (also expressed as "clear and convincing
evidence"), focus on the degree of proof required, which is more aptly
called for in this context.

171.
Proposals
for unacceptably
high standards
include
calls for
"incontrovertible evidence" of an imminent attack, Pogany, supra note 133, at 106, and
"beyond a reasonable doubt," Rockefeller, supranote 72, at 144.
172.
Although international law recognizes the crime of aggression in concept, it
remains undefined. Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court (ICC) art. 5, UN
Doc. A/CONF. 183/9 (July 17, 1998), 37 I.L.M. 1002 (entered into force July 1, 2002),
availableat http://www.icc.cpi.int/library/about/officialjournal/RomeStatute_English.pdf.
Even so, that "crime" would apply to state leaders, not to states themselves, and
aggression is not a prerequisite to the exercise of self-defense. It is also noteworthy that
states resisted attempts to introduce "international crimes" into article 19 of the 1996
Draft Articles on Responsibility of States for Internationally Wrongful Acts. JAMES
CRAWFORD,
THE INTERNATIONAL LAW COMMISSION'S ARTICLES ON STATE
RESPONSIBILITY: INTRODUCTION, TEXT AND COMMENTARIES 16-20 (2002) (noting states'
"[s]trong reservations" and characterizing idea as "divisive"). Accordingly, the Draft
Articles contain no reference to "international crimes." Int'l L. Comm'n, Draft Articles
on Responsibility of States for Internationally Wrongful Acts, adopted by G.A. Res.
56/83, U.N. GAOR, 56th Sess., Supp. No. 10, arts. 40-41, U.N. Doc. A/RES/56/83 (Jan.
28, 2002).
173.
Some, however, have proposed requiring a defending state to prove that the
presumed aggressor had violated international law in order to justify the resort to selfdefense. The Author believes that would be inadvisable not only because that
requirement would effectively invalidate proactive self-defense but also because selfdefense, at bottom, is an inherent right. Accord CHATHAM HOUSE PRINCIPLES, supra
note 17, at 41-42 (stipulating that no proof of breach of international law should be
required).
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c.
Selecting the Most Appropriate Standard. Drawing
from civil law standards, it is proposed that a defending state must
show with "clear and compelling evidence" the existence of a "serious
and urgent need" with respect to a given threat. First, this would
amount to the heaviest civil law evidentiary burden available and
thereby would most effectively eliminate misperceptions or deliberate
abuse. 174 Second, "[e]ven though no express standard of proof exists
in public international law, 'clear and compelling' seems to be an
acceptable standard. '175 Commentators largely concur with this
approach. 17 6 Third, insisting on a heavy burden would provide small
states with an added benefit because they would be less vulnerable to
the pretextual use of self-defensive force by larger or more powerful
177
states than they would under a lower standard.
d.
Scope of Application of the Standard. The evidentiary
standard should apply uniformly to the nature and scale, likelihood,
and timing dimensions that contribute to finding a "serious and
urgent need." The three dimensions must represent integrated parts
of a whole, each warranting equally careful scrutiny. That said, this
standard of proof should apply only to the threat assessment and not

174.
Garwood-Gowers, supra note 57, at 16; accord Martinez, supra note 72, at
167 (suggesting more than "reasonable suspicion" to keep burden high).
175.
Hofmeister, supra note 11, at 48; Martinez, supra note 72, at 167. When the
Security Council "demanded the surrender of the Libyan suspects regarding the
Lockerbie incident and of bin Laden regarding the Embassy bombings in Africa," it
appears to have relied on the lower "prima facie" standard of proof, but that practice
was a function of collective enforcement versus unilateral action. Yee, supra note 46, at
290. The United States justified its self-defensive measures in Afghanistan to the
Security Council following the September 11 attacks on the basis of "clear and
compelling information," and the Security Council registered no objection. Schmitt,
supra note 31, at 757; Hofmeister, supra note 11, at 48. It should be noted, however,
that this representation was made in reference not to evidence of future or ongoing
attacks against the United States or its allies but in reference to identifying "the AlQaeda organization, which is supported by the Taliban regime in Afghanistan" as
playing a "central role in the attacks." Letter from John Negroponte, Perm. Rep. of the
U.S. to the UN, to Pres. of the U.N.S.C., U.N. Doc. S/2001/946 (Oct. 7, 2001).
Significantly, when the United States sought NATO operational support in
Afghanistan, it presented "compelling" evidence that A1-Qaeda was planning further
attacks. O'CONNELL, supra note 6, at 10-11 & n.53.
176.
See Cohan, supranote 49, at 355 (suggesting that there must be compelling
evidence to satisfy an injury of anticipatory self.defense and the appropriate standard
should be greater than a preponderance of the evidence and lower than beyond a
reasonable doubt); Jules Lobel, The Use of Force to Respond to Terrorist Attacks: The
Bombing of Sudan and Afghanistan, 24 YALE J. INT'L L. 537, 551 (1999) (discussing a
reasonable standard as being supported by "clear, unequivocal and convincing
evidence").
177.
See Rockefeller, supra note 72, at 146 (suggesting that a standard of
"weighing of damages" would benefit smaller states).
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to questions of exhaustion of peaceful dispute settlement means or
178
the responsive action itself.
e.
Presumptions. When a standard of proof is under
consideration, the law will sometimes accord a presumption that the
evidence presented is to be viewed in the light most favorable to one
side. Here, however, it seems advisable to maintain a neutral posture
and not lend the benefit of the doubt to either the presumed aggressor
or the defending state. There is no principled basis to so favor the
presumed aggressor, nor should we diminish in any way the high
standard of proof to which the "defender" should be held.
2.

Exhausting Peaceful Alternatives

Once a state has assessed a presumed aggressor's threat, based
on the evidentiary standard set forth above, it must ensure that it
has already exhausted nonmilitary alternatives to repel the threat or
otherwise undertake to do so actively, faithfully and promptly. Such
alternatives may include engaging in bilateral diplomacy (through
negotiation, mediation, or arbitration); referral to the Security
Council; solicitation of assistance from regional security organizations
(whose support may exert a deterrent effect on a potential aggressor);
or even the use of peaceful incentives, disincentives, or counter1 79
threats.
As discussed above, the necessity principle-namely, that
military force should be used only if truly necessary-implies that all
realistic means of peaceful resolution have been fully explored. 8 0
This requirement is consistent with Articles 2(3) and 33 of the UN
Charter.' 8 ' Although exhaustion of peaceful recourse is roundly

178.
But see Martinez, supra note 72, at 167 (requiring a defending state to
show it had satisfied the exhaustion of peaceful means based on "clear, unequivocal
and convincing" or "clear, cogent and convincing" evidence).
179.
Countermeasures, which are non-armed efforts intended to encourage
another state to comply with its international legal obligations (e.g., expelling
foreigners from one's territory or freezing financial assets), would be available as well,
but only in response to an internationally wrongful act. Draft Articles on State
Responsibility, supra note 172, arts. 49-53.
180.
Of course, to the extent a defending state learns of an imminent threat
that, as a practical matter, leaves no time to pursue peaceful recourse, such measures
would be deemed unavailable.
181.
Article 2 provides: "All Members shall settle their international disputes by
peaceful means in such a manner that international peace and security, and justice,
are not endangered." U.N. Charter art. 2,
3. Article 33 imposes a substantially
similar, although not identical, mandate: "The parties to any dispute, the continuance
of which is likely to endanger the maintenance of international peace and security,
shall, first of all, seek a solution by negotiation, enquiry, mediation, conciliation,
arbitration, judicial settlement, resort to regional agencies or arrangements, or other
peaceful means of their own choice." U.N. Charter art. 33, 1.
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accepted in principle, 182 one could imagine several possible
permutations. The requirement could, for instance, call for: (1) good
faith efforts or those that appeared subjectively reasonable to the
defending state; (2) an objective effort to explore every available
peaceful measure; or (3) an objective effort subject to some condition,
such as exhaustion of any feasible and meaningful alternatives to
armed force. The last option is preferred; it would require the
exhaustion of all reasonable and worthwhile prospects for resolution,
treating other theoretically available options as irrelevant. 183 This
approach would ensure that every bona fide, non-facially futile
alternative to force had been explored and thereby insist on strict
accountability. It is readily acknowledged that the term "meaningful"
is open to interpretation; however, states would be expected in good
faith to treat this term expansively rather than restrictively in light
of its purpose, and their efforts (or lack thereof) ultimately would be
subject to a reasonableness review. 184 To reinforce this requirement,
the pursuit of peaceful alternatives should be treated not as a
185
contingency option but as an affirmative and continuing duty.
3.

Taking Responsive Action

Upon determining that a "serious and urgent need" exists and
having exhausted the requisite peaceful alternatives, a state may
well be prepared to launch a first strike in self-defense. Any such
defensive measure must, however, meet two central requirements:
such conduct must be strictly necessary and tailored to repel the
threat posed, and it must comply with applicable international
agreements and obligations.
i. Necessary and Tailored to Repel the Threat. The use of
defensive force must be necessary to avert or repel a given military
threat or else such force might serve an improper purpose, such as
retaliation for past acts or territorial annexation.18 6 A proactive
defensive strike, however, could have the collateral benefit of general
deterrence so long as it was principally aimed at thwarting a genuine

CHATHAM HOUSE PRINCIPLES, supra note 17, at 7; Gill, supra note 14, at
182.
362; Polebaum, supra note 11, at 212; Sofaer, supra note 10, at 220.
56(c) (posing the
183.
Accord High-Level Panel Report, supra note 10,
question: "Has every non-military option for meeting the threat in question been
explored, with reasonable grounds for believing that other measures will not
succeed?").
See infra Part V.C.
184.
185.
See Polebaum, supra note 11, at 212 (endorsing concept of exhaustion as an
"affirmative duty"); Sofaer, supra note 10, at 223 (calling for a "continuing duty").
186.
See Bonafede, supra note 97, at 213 (discussing improper U.S. retaliation
by launching missile strikes in Afghanistan and Sudan); Svarc, supra note 29, at 179
(stating that self-defense must not be retributive or punitive).
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military threat. 8 7 In addition, the responsive measure must stand a
reasonable chance of success in meeting its objective.18 8 If the
defending state does not believe the particular force exercised will
avert or otherwise diminish the threat, then logic dictates that such
force would be fruitless and hence unnecessary.
Further, the defensive action must be tailored to repel the threat
posed, thereby implicating the jus ad bellum proportionality
principle. Consistent with that principle, the intensity of force used
need not be commensurate with the degree or quantum of force
threatened.' 8 9 Instead, proportionality of force is a function of the
objective sought and, thus, the force must be no greater than strictly
needed to repel the given threat. 190 As a result, there is a fair chance
that the quantum of defensive force used will in fact exceed that
presented by the threat itself. After all, it is difficult to judge in
advance both the precise degree of force threatened and the extent of
191
military power required to repel it.
As a prudential constraint,
therefore, an outer limit on the damage wrought (versus the quantum
of force used) is needed, based upon the "balance of consequences"
principle.
This principle weighs the estimated consequences of proactive
defensive action (i.e., what damage the "defending" state likely would
cause the enemy) against the consequences of not taking proactive
defensive action (i.e., what damage the presumed aggressor state
likely would cause). 192 In most cases, the proportionality test would
dictate the upshot and result in a level of damage below that
anticipated by the threatened attack because the defending state is
only entitled to thwart the threat to the extent necessary. Thus, the
balance of consequences principle likely would apply only in
exceptional instances where repelling the threat would entail a level
of destruction or death exceeding that of the feared attack.

187.
See High-Level Panel Report, supra note 10, 207(b) (relying on a primary
purpose test).
188.
Id.
207(e); Hofmeister, supra note 11, at 49-50 (noting this factor tracks
with just war theory).
189.
See supranote 35 and accompanying text.
190.
See supra note 36 and accompanying text; Nydell, supra note 16, at 489
(citing the Israeli attack on Osirak as an example of a proactive defensive strike that
satisfied the proportionality criteria: "The fact that [it] was strictly limited to one
nuclear facility, and was not a precursor to further attacks upon Iraq, gives credence to
the view that Israel believed it was acting in a purely defensive manner. Certainly, the
raid was planned to minimize the possibility of casualties.").
191.
BROWNLIE, supra note 24, at 259; GARDAM, supra note 9, at 179; WICKER,
supra note 35, at 59-60.
192.
See High-Level Panel Report, supra note 10, 1 207(e) (posing for
consideration in a state's decision calculus: "Is there a reasonable chance of the
military action being successful in meeting the threat in question, with the
consequences of action not likely to be worse than the consequences of inaction?").
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Determining where precisely to strike the proper balance in such
cases, as applied in good faith, presents several options. The level of
damage expected by the defensive force could be set, for example:
(1) necessarily lower than the anticipated consequences of the
threatened attack; 193 (2) roughly equal or comparable to the
anticipated consequences of the threatened attack; or (3) not
significantly higher than the anticipated consequences of the
threatened attack.1 94 The point here is not to unduly burden the
defending state even, conceivably, to the point of eliminating military
options that would otherwise pass muster under the proportionality
principle (as in the "necessarily lower" case). Rather, the goal is to
place a reasonable upper limit on the consequences of a defensive
first strike while, at the same time, insisting on a calibration that
would not be too susceptible to misunderstanding or exploitation (as
in the case of "not significantly higher"). From this perspective, the
middle option offers the best course.
Another question that arises is how to define the scope of the
threat to be repelled. Is it the immediate threat posed or the more
generalized threat emanating from a particular source? Views on
this matter vary widely. Three principal schools of thought have been
identified: (1) the "eye-for-an-eye" school which dictates that the
response must be limited to extinguishing the immediate threat only;
(2) the "cumulative effects" school, permitting a defensive measure to
strike at the adversary to a degree on par with the aggregate harms it
has caused over time; or (3) the "eye-for-a-tooth" school in which the
strike may seek to expunge the overall threat posed by taking a more
aggressively deterrent posture to future attacks. 19 5 The governing
standard should be the "eye-for-an-eye" approach,1 96 as it tracks most
closely with the limited and tactical function of self-defense.
Furthermore, the other approaches would be far more difficult to
delineate from an operational standpoint; for example, how many
past attacks would qualify within the cumulative effects test, 197 and

193.
See Cohan, supra note 49, at 355 ("The probable damage to be done by any
preventive action should be markedly less than the anticipated injury.").
194.
See CHATHAM HOUSE PRINCIPLES, supra note 17, at 10 ("The physical and
economic consequences of the force used must not be excessive in relation to the harm
expected from the attack.").
195.
AREND & BECK, supra note 44, at 165-66 (discussing alternatives); see also
William H. Taft IV, Self-Defense and the Oil Platforms Decision, 29 YALE J. INT'L L.
295, 299 (2004) (embracing the deterrence view wherein proportionality would not be
pegged to the attack immediately preceding the defensive measure but rather to the
overall threat posed).
196.
Applying such a proportionality analysis in the context of combating
terrorists (absent state attribution) lies beyond the scope of this article.
197.
Bonafede, supra note 97, at 184.
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how extensive a force could be used if intended to deter future attacks
writ large? 198
ii. Compliance with International Oblig-ations. The use of
proactive defensive force also must fully comply with applicable
international obligations, most notably including those reflected in:
(1) the UN Charter (e.g., deferring to the Security Council once it "has
taken measures necessary to maintain international peace and
security" 199); (2) customary international law; (3) the Geneva
Conventions of 1949 and, to the extent it constitutes customary
international law, Additional Protocol I of 1977 (including the
principles of discrimination, military necessity, and proportionality
under jus in bello); and (4) any relevant weapons conventions (e.g.,
the 1993 Chemical Weapons Convention).
B. ProceduralSafeguards
Certain procedural safeguards will help reinforce the
effectiveness, and otherwise facilitate execution, of the substantive
elements discussed above.
1.

Burden of Proof

The burden to prove that the threat posed was sufficiently great
to warrant action (i.e., that it rose to the level of a "serious and urgent
200
need") should lie with the state that moved to strike proactively.
Although that state might well perceive itself to be merely acting in
self-defense and not to have provoked hostilities, as the first to use
force it must justify its threat assessment under the applicable
This procedural requirement tracks the
evidentiary standard.
20 1
existing rule.
2.

Requirement Prior to Taking Action

The only procedural rule that should be imposed on a state prior
to its exercising proactive defensive force is to refer its concerns to the
Security Council to the maximum extent possible consistent with the

198.
In applying this concept of proportionality to the scenario involving a series
of pin-prick strikes, the target state should define the immediate threat narrowly to
determine what is strictly necessary to repel it. Under the proposed approach, the
target state's defensive action could lawfully exceed the force expected to be used
against it, but the expected consequences would have to aim in good faith to meet the
"roughly comparable" standard outlined above.
U.N. Charter art. 51.
199.
200.
Rockefeller, supra note 72, at 145.
See supranote 41 and accompanying text.
201.
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20 2
standard outlined above for exhausting peaceful alternatives.
Procedures recommended by others, such as requiring states to warn
a presumed aggressor before commencing a defensive assault 20 3 or to
publicize the anticipated threat in order to spur dialogue or
diplomacy, 20 4 are unobjectionable to the extent they prove feasible
and meaningful as peaceful means of dispute resolution in a given
circumstance, but this Author would not categorically mandate them.

3.

Requirements After Taking Action

Two procedural requirements are essential following the
proactive use of force in self-defense. First, in accordance with Article
51, a state must immediately report its defensive action to the
Security Council. 20 5 Second, to the extent the threat information
upon which a defending state relied in determining a "serious and
urgent need" was not observable, verifiable, or otherwise available in
the public domain, the state must affirmatively meet its burden
under the "clear and compelling" standard of proof. To that end,
evidence upon which the defending state based the need to act must
be made available to the international community at large, 20 6
including, at a minimum, to the United Nations.
To be sure,
however, prudential limits on such scrutiny should be recognized (as
they are in U.S. federal courts and other foreign domestic and
international criminal tribunals) with respect to the disclosure of
sensitive intelligence sources and methods. 20 7 This requirement is
not a material departure from the current standard, under which a
state must put forth evidence that it acted reasonably under the
circumstances.

202.
Accord Martinez, supra note 72, at 168-69 (requiring recourse to the
Security Council in "all but the most urgent circumstances").
203.
Cohan, supra note 49, at 355.
204.
Polebaum, supranote 11, at 210.
205.
U.N. Charter art. 51. Indeed, it is in a state's self-interest to report to the
Security Council, as the ICJ has opined that "the absence of a report may be one of the
factors indicating whether the State in question was itself convinced that it was acting
in self-defence." Military and Paramilitary Activities (Nicar. v. U.S.), 1986 I.C.J. 14,
200 (June 27).
206.
Hofmeister, supra note 11, at 48; Martinez, supranote 72, at 180-81.
207.
See CHATHAM HOUSE PRINCIPLES, supra note 17, at 9 (suggesting that
there should be "proper internal procedures for the assessment of intelligence and
appropriate procedural safeguards"); Martinez, supra note 72, at 167-68 (recognizing
that limits should be placed so as to respect certain intelligence sources). For example,
some intelligence material might be amenable to production in summary or redacted
form to protect sensitive national security information while still satisfying the
evidentiary burden. See, e.g., Classified Information Procedures Act (CIPA), Pub. L. No.
96-456, § 6(c), 94 Stat. 2025, 2025 (1980) (discussing alternative procedures for the
disclosure of classified information).
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Accountability

A state's use of defensive force would ideally be subject to
international review in the first instance by the Security Council,
which not only has "primary responsibility for the maintenance of
international peace and security" 20 8 within the UN, but also "[t]he
Members of the United Nations agree to accept and carry out the
decisions of the Security Council in accordance with the present
Charter. '20 9 Although the Council is thus a uniquely situated forum
for the review of "use of force" decisions by states, it is unclear how its
five permanent members-the United States, China, the United
Kingdom, France, and Russia 21 0 -could be held strictly accountable
for any violations of their own in the exercise of proactive selfdefense. After all, they have the express power to veto any resolution
condemning their behavior or requiring reparations.21 1 Although
questions of UN procedural reform are beyond the scope of this paper,
and this Author would disfavor any reform that dispensed with the
veto power, 212 it remains open to question whether there could be a
place for binding international arbitration between a permanent
Security Council member state that exercised "defensive" force and
the perceived aggressor state, at least in a situation where, but for
the single veto exercised by the permanent member at issue, the
Security Council unanimously 2 13 found that member to have acted
unlawfully.

208.
U.N. Charter art. 24. The Security Council's responsibility is "primary"not exclusive-within the Charter regime, so that the General Assembly could also
potentially play this international review role.
209.
Id. art. 25.
210.
Id. art. 23. Russia is the recognized successor in this regard to the Soviet
Union.
211.
Id. art. 27, 1 3 (requiring in nonprocedural matters not only "an affirmative
vote of nine [of 15] members" but also the "concurring votes of the permanent
members"). Although a permanent member always could be held "accountable"
politically to the extent that states can communicate their disapproval through
diplomatic statements and voting behavior, we are concerned here with strict
accountability in the formal and institutional sense.
212.
Accord U.N. Charter arts. 27,
3; id. art. 52,
3 (requiring a permanent
member to abstain from a Security Council vote when such a member is a "party to a
dispute" in connection with a Council action to "encourage the development of pacific
settlement of local disputes"). Contra CASSESE, supra note 65, at 363 (calling for a
permanent member to "forgo its veto power when voting" on the lawfulness of its own
preemptive force in self-defense).
213.
"Unanimous" in this context means either a 14-1 vote of the Security
Council or any other result involving abstentions in which the permanent member at
issue otherwise stood alone in defending the lawfulness of its allegedly defensive use of
force.
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This modest concept, 214 which would apply only in the most
extreme cases, would foster a greater sense of fairness and adherence
to the rule of law, provide a buffer against significant abuses and
impunity, and more strictly adhere to the principle of the sovereign
equality of states. 2 15 This approach also would demonstrate good will
on the part of the permanent members while reflecting the notion
articulated in the Charter preamble that states are to act in the
international community's "common interest. ' 2 16 Moreover, placing
the merits of the case in the hands of an arbitration panel (with one
arbitrator chosen by each party and one or more neutral members
selected jointly by the other two) should allay any potential concern
about a politicized decision maker.

C. Standard of Review
The standard of review lies at the heart of this analysis as it
community-principally
the
international
how
determines

represented by the Security Council, but also conceivably by the
General Assembly, an international tribunal like the ICJ, or an
international arbitration forum like the Permanent Court of
judge the lawfulness of a state's exercise of
Arbitration 217-will

214.
Binding arbitration between states, including in recent years by Security
Council permanent members, is not without precedent. See, e.g, Rainbow Warrior Case
(N.Z. v. Fr.), 82 INT'L L. REP. 499 (Fr.-N.Z. Arb. Trib. 1990) (concerning an extradition
request by France and a demand for reparations by New Zealand arising out of the
destruction by French agents of a civilian ship docked in Auckland); Abraham
Abramovsky, ExtraterritorialJurisdiction: The United States UnwarrantedAttempt to
Alter InternationalLaw in United States v. Yunis, 15 YALE J. INT'L L. 121, 157 & n.177
(1990) (noting that the United States and the Soviet Union agreed to submit to binding
arbitration by the ICJ with respect to disputes over the interpretation of seven treaties
dealing with such issues as hijacking and acts of terrorism). More aggressive
approaches not endorsed here might include requiring states that use force in selfdefense to "consent to the jurisdiction of the International Court of Justice for any
violation of international law." Nabati, supra note 11, at 800-01.
See Declaration on Principles of Int'l Law Concerning Friendly Relations
215.
and Cooperation Among States in Accordance with the Charterof the United Nations,
G.A.Res. 2625 (XXV) (Oct. 24, 1970).
All States enjoy sovereign equality. They have equal rights and duties and are
equal members of the international community, notwithstanding differences of
an economic, social, political, or other nature ....(f) Each State has the duty to
comply fully and in good faith with its international obligations and to live in
peace with other States.
U.N. Charter pmbl. (stating that member states agree "to ensure, by the
216.
acceptance of principles and the institution of methods, that armed force shall not be
used, save in the common interest").
The Permanent Court of Arbitration in The Hague has been utilized to
217.
resolve various kinds of inter-state disputes. E.g., Eritrea-Ethiopia Claims
Commission, Awards on Prisoner of War Claims, Perm. Ct. of Arb., July 1, 2003,
= 1
151.
available at http://www.pca-cpa.org/showpage.asp?pag-id
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proactive self-defense. 218 The consequences that might befall a state
that failed to satisfy the standard of review would be left to the
judging body, but it would seem appropriate that states found to have
acted unlawfully be willing, at a minimum, to make reparations to an
injured state. 2 19 The key determinant for that review should be the
notion of reasonableness. The discussion of that concept proceeds
under the following three subheadings: (1) the value and benefits of
reasonableness as a guiding principle; (2) selecting a specific type of
reasonableness; and (3) matters relevant to applying reasonableness.
1.

Value and Benefits of Reasonableness

Reasonableness has been described as "that most comprehensive
and fundamental test of all law. ' 220 Its principal merits in this
context are four-fold: (1) it provides a "disciplined" framework for
evaluation; 221 (2) it introduces a significant degree of objectivity into
the calculation by embodying the "basic principle that no nation

218.
The idea of state conduct being reviewed and enforced by a collective body
or adjudicative panel may seem self-evident today; however, it stands in marked
contrast to the evaluative scheme on which the ill-fated Covenant of the League of
Nations was based. Under the Covenant:
[I]t was left to each member to decide whether a breach had occurred or an act
of war had been committed, so that even the obligation to apply economic
sanctions under Article 16(1) was dependent on the member's own view of the
situation. Military sanctions could be recommended by the Council [of the
League], but the decision on whether to apply them rested with each member.
DEREK W. BOWETT,THE LAW OF INTERNATIONAL INSTITUTIONS 17-18 (Steven & Sons
4th ed. 1982) (1964). Likewise, under the Pact of Paris of 1928 (also known as the
Kellogg-Briand Pact or the General Treaty for the Renunciation of War), "no competent
body was established to determine whether a State employing force was acting in selfdefence or in breach of the Pact." DINSTEIN, supra note 5, at 84.
219.
See CASSESE, supra note 65, at 362-63 (proposing that if the use of force
was unlawful, then the "State concerned must be ready to pay compensation to the
State attacked"). The International Law Commission identifies various forms of
reparation for an "injury caused by the internationally wrongful act," including
"restitution, compensation and satisfaction, either singly or in combination." Draft
Articles on State Responsibility, supra note 172, ch. II ("Reparation for Injury").
220.
McDOUGAL & FELICIANO, supra note 7, at 218. Some also have suggested
that "good faith" ought to be used to evaluate state conduct in this context. See, e.g.,
Shapira, supra note 56, at 74 (characterizing good faith, along with reasonableness, as
"age-old legal concepts" applicable for "passing judgment on these motivations and
grounds [for use of force in self-defense]"). But see CASSESE, supra note 14, at 152-53
(pointing out that the principle of good faith "does not specify how States must behave
but merely conveys the idea that international subjects must not take advantage of
their rights (or discharge their obligations) in such a way as to thwart the purpose and
object of legal rules").
221.
See McDOUGAL & FELICIANO, supra note 7, at 218 ("[R]easonableness in
particular context does not mean arbitrariness in decision but in fact its exact opposite,
the disciplined ascription of policy import to varying factors.").
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should be final judge of its own actions";222 (3) it represents the very
type of behavior states have come to expect of one another and should
expect of one another; and (4) it is a sufficiently versatile concept to
cover all imaginable scenarios and contingencies. 223 At the same
time, this Author would reject a purely subjective form of
224
reasonableness--one based on an honest or genuine belief because it would be too prone to abuse.
2.

Selecting a Type of Reasonableness

There are, then, three varieties of reasonableness from which to
choose: (1) the strictly objective test of the "reasonable nation" in the
situation at hand 225 (which appears to be the prevailing norm); (2) a
two-pronged approach that calls for justification on independent
objective and subjective grounds; 226 and (3) a hybrid test in which a
state's subjective (actual) perception of a threat is evaluated'
objectively for its reasonableness under the circumstances. 22 7 The
last approach is preferred.
The problem with the second view is that a state's subjective
beliefs would be accorded a position of legal legitimacy on par with an
objective assessment. The first choice, which rejects subjectivity
altogether, ignores the reality that states facing significant threats to
their security, especially when their very existence or sovereignty is
at stake, typically do not act as detached, impartial actors that make
decisions based on measured deliberation. 228 Instead, under such
pressure, states' behavior often reflects a degree of desperation,

222.
Zedalis, supra note 159, at 150; see also Polebaum, supra note 11, at 212
(commenting that the reasonableness standard places a "premium on objectively
verifiable evidence"). But see Michael Bothe, Terrorism and the Legality of Pre-emptive
Force, 14 EUR. J. INT'L L. 227, 237 (2003) ("[A] standard of reasonableness boils down to
subjectivity and speculation.").
223.
Reasonableness would apply whether a state used defensive force
proactively, for example, on account of its survival, to protect its political sovereignty,
to protect its citizens from harm, or to defend its military infrastructure.
224.
See RODIN, supranote 28, at 42 (finding honest belief insufficient).
225.
See Edward Miller, Self-Defence, International Law, and the Six Day War,
20 ISR. L. REV. 49, 60 (1985) (describing the "reasonable state" standard).
226.
See Nabati, supra note 11, at 800 (requiring a defending state to have both
"an actual and reasonable belief, as established by clear and convincing evidence, that
self defense is justified"); Shapira, supra note 56, at 74-75 (asking whether defending
state "genuinely and reasonably" believed that the other side was launching an attack
or could launch an attack).
227.
See Polebaum, supranote 11, at 208-09 (advocating the following standard:
"whether the nation's perceptions were reasonable, given the actual circumstances
under which it acted, and whether a reasonable nation with such perceptions would
have acted the same way"); Zedalis, supra note 159, at 150 ("Legitimate reliance on
self-defense requires that the state invoking the right actually perceive itself as
threatened and that this perception be based on circumstances which would suggest its
reasonableness.").
228.
RODIN, supra note 28, at 42.
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perhaps infused with a survival instinct. In addition, some states,
because of their small size and prevailing sense of vulnerability, may
understandably be more inclined, ceteris paribus, to use proactive
force in the face of certain threats than would a large and powerful
state with greater retaliatory capability.
Therefore, it is prudent to evaluate the exercise of self-defensive
force with a mind toward such considerations, rather than from the
perspective of a neutral observer, devoid of any particular national
history or individualized orientation. 2 29 Indeed, "[i]n common law
countries, the municipal law test concerning the state of mind of an
individual invoking self-defense has both a subjective and an
objective component. ' 230 Some commentators have drawn an analogy
to "Battered Woman's Syndrome," in which courts have increasingly
been open to expert testimony on the psychology of the accused in
order to better ascertain her motivations in confronting a repeatedly
abusive husband not immediately before an episode of abuse, but
23 1
rather while the husband lies asleep or is otherwise defenseless.
In such instances, the battered woman's subjective mental
perspective is then evaluated for its reasonableness. Notably, this
approach need not be without limits regarding which factors can be
considered as properly contributing to one's subjective state of mind
232
in order to justify lethal conduct.
3.

Applying the Reasonableness Standard

It is not enough, however, to choose a particular type of
reasonableness as the preferred standard; there also must be some
guidelines for applying that standard. There are three key points in
this respect.
i. Scope of Application. The hybrid reasonableness standard
should be applied wholesale to the conduct of the "defending" state.
The standard would evaluate principally whether that state actively
and faithfully sought to avert hostilities by pursuing realistic
alternatives to force, whether the nature and extent of the force
actually employed was necessary and proportional, and whether the
state's conduct complied with its international legal obligations.

229.
See KOLB, supra note 26, at 128 (noting that the concept of reasonableness
varies by state based on its "own interests, history, contingencies of life with other
nations, ideology, [and] geopolitical position").
230.,
Zedalis, supra note 159, at 150.
231.
E.g., Skopets, supra note 49, at 756-57 (analogizing preemptive strikes to
battered woman's syndrome).
232.
Polebaum, supra note 11, at 212 n.142 (referencing State v. Wanraw, 559
P.2d 548 (Wash. 1977), in which the court, in determining whether the defendant acted
in reasonable self-defense in using lethal force against a home intruder, "refused to
admit evidence of the effect of the defendant's Indian culture on her perceptions or
actions").
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Significantly, however, the standard of review would not apply to the
state's threat assessment, because that determination would fall
under the "clear and compelling' evidentiary standard.
ii. Factorsfor Consideration. It must also be clear which factors
will be taken into account during the reasonableness review. This
Author endorses the well- established "totality of circumstances"
'2 33
are
approach whereby all "relevant and determinative factors
23 4
Some
assessed for their significance-not just selected ones.
commentators have expressed concern about the "malleable and
boundless" nature of a "totality of the circumstances" test in other
contexts, 23 5 but for the purposes of evaluating the lawfulness of the
use of force, it is imperative to consider all pertinent facts bearing on
that decision.
iii. Ex Ante Perceptions or Ex Post Reality? A separate but
related issue is whether, in judging the exercise of force itself for its
necessity and proportionality, the expected or the actual result should
count. The key determinant should be what the defending state ex
ante "reasonably anticipated" to occur. In practice, states determine
whether to engage in proactive self-defense based on intelligence
about the enemy, such as its stated or apparent intentions, the scale
and deployment of its military forces, and so forth. In addition,
military operations are often developed with imperfect information.
Hindsight often reveals what was really being planned and what
actually happened, but it is a luxury states facing threats to their
security do not have, and it would, therefore, be inappropriate to
apply such an unrealistically high standard. 23 6 Notably, that position
2 37
and
is consistent with the rules of international humanitarian law
would still permit a state to be held fully accountable for its actions
on an objective basis.

The U.S. Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit treated the "totality of
233.
the circumstances" test and the "relevant, determinative circumstances" test as
synonymous. Smith v. Principi, 343 F.3d 1358, 1362-63 (Fed. Cir. 2003).
Contra Pfaff v. Wells Electronics, Inc., 525 U.S. 55, 65-66 (1998) (replacing
234.
"totality of the circumstances" test with a more tailored, two-pronged test for purposes
of evaluating certain conduct in connection with the issuance of patents).
E.g., Kathryn Zunno, United States v. Kincade and the Constitutionalityof
235.
the FederalDNA Act: Why We'll Need a New Pairof Genes to Wear Down the Slippery
Slope, 79 ST. JOHN'S L. REV. 769, 777-78 (2005) (discussing the Ninth Circuit's
application of the totality of circumstances).
See DINSTEIN, supra note 5, at 192 ("The invocation of the right of self236.
defence must be weighed on the ground of the information available (and reasonably
interpreted) at the moment of action, without the benefit of post factum wisdom.");
Shapira, supra note 56, at 76 (stating that a state's determination that it is about to be
attacked "must be examined in terms of the conditions prevailing at the time when the
decision was taken, not with the wisdom of hindsight").
See Additional Protocol I, supra note 34, art. 51(5)(b) (measuring
237.
proportionality in terms of what "may be expected to cause incidental loss[es]").
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D. Summary of Proposal
The following section summarizes the reform proposal as a
238
unified whole.
1.

Substantive Elements

i. Gauging the Threat. To justify proactive self-defense, a state
must demonstrate by "clear and compelling evidence" a "serious and
urgent need" to exercise force based on the anticipated (1) nature and
scale (including at least a de minimis level of anticipated force);
(2) likelihood ("effective irrevocability"); and (3) timing ("last window
of opportunity" available to avoid having one's security seriously
compromised) of a threatened attack.
ii. Exhausting Peaceful Alternatives.
Before launching a
defensive first strike, a state must have actively and faithfully
pursued to exhaustion, as an affirmative and continuing duty, any
nonmilitary alternatives that are both objectively feasible and
meaningful in order to repel the threat.
iii. Taking Responsive Action. Proactive defensive force must be
(1) undertaken only if necessary, and then only to the extent strictly
required to repel the threatened force; (2) reasonably capable of
achieving that aim without in good faith causing more harm than
roughly approximates the anticipated consequences posed by the
threat itself; and (3) executed in full compliance with applicable
international agreements and other legal obligations.
2.

Procedural Safeguards

i. Burden of Proof. The burden of proof lies with the state that
employs proactive self-defense.
ii. Requirement Prior to Taking Action.
Before taking
preemptive action, a state must refer its threat concerns to the
Security Council to the extent possible, consistent with the standard
for exhausting peaceful alternatives.
iii. Requirement After Taking Action.
Following the use of
preemptive force, a state must promptly report its "defensive" action
to the Security Council and make available to the international
community any nonobservable or nonpublic information (to the extent
required in light of the understandable protection accorded sensitive
intelligence sources and methods) relied upon to justify its action.

238.
Although this proposed standard is intended to govern the use of proactive
self-defense by states, it may be applicable, to some extent, to measures taken by a
collective security arrangement authorized by the Security Council pursuant to
Chapter VII of the UN Charter as well.
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To ensure at least some formal and
iv.Accountability.
enforceable accountability regarding proactive defensive force
undertaken by a permanent member of the Security Council,
consideration should be given to the establishment of binding
international arbitration, specifically for cases where, but for exercise
of its veto power, there would have been a unanimous Security
Council vote finding a permanent member at fault for the unlawful
use of force.
3.

Standard of Review

It is recommended that states' efforts to resolve disputes
peacefully, as well as the nature, severity, and duration of any
proactive force subsequently undertaken, be reviewed for their
lawfulness by the Security Council (or other appropriate collective
body, whether political, adjudicative, or arbitral) under a "hybrid
reasonableness" test, which would: (1) factor in the defending state's
subjectivity in its objective review of conduct; (2) account for the
"totality of circumstances"; (3) be applied on an ex ante basis; and (4)
not accord any presumptions.
E. Adoption of the Standard
Having detailed the proposed standard of proactive self-defense,
the feasibility of its adoption as the governing law is now considered.
The two key considerations anchoring this analysis are the available
vehicles of adoption and their likelihood of success.
1.

Possible Vehicles

Five possible avenues of adoption exist for this (or, for that
matter, any proposed) legal standard involving resort to selfdefensive force. First, the standard could be adopted through an
amendment to Article 51 of the UN Charter. The amendment
procedure under the Charter presents a formidable and timeconsuming challenge, 239 as it would require not only a two-thirds vote

To date, there has been virtually no political will to amend the Charter.
239.
See Henkin, supra note 106, at 57 ('The law of the Charter has not been formally
amended. States generally have essentially maintained the original meaning of the
Charter, both in formal resolutions of international bodies and in individual
statements, and the International Court of Justice has largely reaffirmed it."). In
addition, after hostilities in Kosovo ended, which arguably amounted to an exercise in
humanitarian intervention-a type of force not expressly countenanced under the
Charter-the Clinton Administration "did not argue for changing the law or
institutions of the Charter." O'CONNELL, supra note 6, at 17; see also Cassese, supra
note 52, at 520 (noting multiple failed efforts in the 1970s to update the Charter on the
"issue of nuclear weapons").
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of the General Assembly, but, more importantly, ratification "in
accordance with their respective constitutional processes by two
thirds of the Members of the United Nations. ' 240 Even if that process
was satisfied, the proposed amendment would still require
24 1
ratification by all five permanent members to become effective.
Second, the standard could be incorporated into a universal (or
near-universal) international agreement-independent
of, but
presumably including reference to, the UN Charter. However, this
approach similarly would almost certainly encounter substantial
resistance.

24 2

Third, the Security Council or General Assembly could issue a
statement of principles or set of guidelines governing when proactive
self-defensive force would be deemed lawful. Such guidance, which
would be merely hortatory, could be issued by the fifteen-member
Security Council, 243 the five permanent members alone, 244 or a
unanimous resolution of the General Assembly with the full
concurrence of the permanent members. 245 Such a statement might
build upon the High-Level Panel Report adopted by the UN
Secretary-General. 24 6
This prospect seems equally improbable,
largely for the same reasons that states would likely oppose the
treaty vehicle.
Fourth, the Security Council (or General Assembly) could
47
request an advisory opinion from the International Court of Justice
concerning lawful state practice with regard to proactive self-defense.

240.
U.N. Charter art. 108; see also Edward C. Luck, Prospects for Reform:
Principal Organs, in THE OXFORD HANDBOOK ON THE UNITED NATIONS 653, 654
(Thomas G. Weiss & Sam Davis eds., 2007) (discussing the arduous process for
amending the Charter).
241.
U.N. Charter art. 108.
242.
See Cassese, supra note 52, at 520 (identifying failures to effect
international legislative change in the contexts of the 1970 Friendly Relations
Declaration and the 1974 Definition of Aggression); Taylor, supra note 51, at 69 ("[T]o
think of developing a new legally binding convention or protocol through the UN or a
specially convened international intergovernmental conference is unrealistic."). In
addition, the major powers are generally disinclined to clarify the prevailing standard
on proactive self-defense because the more ambiguity that remains, the greater the
operational latitude they continue to enjoy. See supra note 51 and accompanying text.
243.
Garwood-Gowers, supra note 57, at 16-17.
244.
David Sloss, Forcible Arms Control: Preemptive Attacks on Nuclear
Facilities,4 CHI. J. INT'L L. 39, 57 (2003).
245.
CASSESE, supra note 65, at 363.
246.
Significantly, the Report expressed the hope that individual states would
subscribe to its guidelines, although they were primarily intended for use by the
Security Council. High-Level Panel Report, supra note 10, 209.
247.
Erin L. Guruli, The Terrorism Era: Should the International Community
Redefine Its Legal Standards on Use of Force in Self-Defense?, 12 WILLAMETTE J. INT'L
L. & DISPUTE RES. 100, 122 (2004).
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This possibility, too, seems extremely remote 248 and, in any event,
would be unlikely to provide more than abstract guidance on an issue
249
that is not ideally suited to judicial determination in the first place.
Fifth, the proposed standard could be incrementally adopted
through the ongoing development of customary international law.
For present purposes, evidence that qualifies as customary
250
taken
international law includes actions, statements, or positions
on behalf of a state by its official representatives. Statements alone,
unaccompanied by the military acts of a given state, are deemed
herein to possess probative value. 25 1 Accordingly, customary law
would include state behavior through a combination of verbal
statements, individual votes in international bodies, and real or
purported instances of proactive self-defense. 252 To that end, it would
be helpful if states, particularly on a collective basis through existing
"alliance groupings," vocalized their support for this standard; such
nonbinding declarations could at least hasten the development of a
253
consensus.
Although adoption of the proposed standard via customary law
appears to be the most viable approach, 254 it could also take

See Schachter, supra note 18, at 144 ("Neither governments nor their
248.
peoples are ready, by and large, to entrust their security and vital interest to foreign
judges or international organs.").
See, e.g., Nuclear Weapons Opinion, 1996 I.C.J. 226 (rendering an
249.
inconclusive, if not affirmatively unhelpful, opinion with respect to a query regarding
whether the threat or use of nuclear weapons is ever permissible under international
law).
LAN BROWNLIE, PRINCIPLES OF PUBLIC INTERNATIONAL LAw 6 (6th ed. 2003)
250.
(noting that evidence of customary international law may include, e.g., diplomatic
correspondence, press releases, military manuals, and policy statements). Although
state acquiescence through silence can also contribute to these objective elements,
interpreting silence can be precarious because it could signal indifference or indecision
as easily as consent. Id. at 8.
See Mary Ellen O'Connell, Taking Opinio Juris Seriously, in CUSTOMARY
251.
INTERNATIONAL LAW ON THE USE OF FORCE 14-15 (Enzo Cannizzaro & Paolo Palchetti
eds. 2005) (stating that physical and verbal acts alike count toward the formation or
change of customary international law). But see Military and Paramilitary Activities
(Nicar. v. U.S.), 1986 I.C.J. 14, 184 (June 27).
The mere fact that States declare their recognition of certain rules is not
sufficient for the Court to consider these as being part of customary
The Court must satisfy itself that the existence of the
international law ....
rule in the opiniojuris of States is confirmed by practice.
Id. (emphasis added).
See Military and ParamilitaryActivities, 1986 I.C.J. 14, 207 (noting that
252.
customary international law accounts for both state actions as well as the conduct of
"States in a position to react to [such actions]").
Taylor, supra note 51, at 69-70 (proposing, inter alia, "joint policy
253.
statements" by "NATO and the European Union").
See Bothe, supra note 222, at 236 (concluding that customary law offers a
254.
likely vehicle for change of a legal standard, citing by way of example the exclusive
economic zones under the Law of the Sea).
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considerable time, especially given the strongly held opinions and
vastly diverse interests of states on this issue; would probably be
disproportionately influenced by the major powers; would develop on
a "piecemeal" basis; 255 and would likely remain only generally
defined. In sum, while coherent and careful delineation of the
permissibility of self-defensive force through multilateral agreement
is preferable to slow, potentially slanted, ad hoc development, the
Author remains skeptical of that prospect.
2.

Likelihood of Success

In light of the role of customary law as the probably vehicle for
adoption, the proposed reforms will stand a greater chance of success
if they do not deviate considerably from the presumed existing
standard. Upon close inspection, it is clear that the proposed and
current standards actually have much in common. To draw this
comparison as sharply as possible, the following commentary is
divided into three parts: fundamental commonalities, clarifying
provisions, and substantive distinctions.
i. Fundamental Commonalities. Areas in which the existing
and proposed standards share basic features include: (1) the burden
of proof; (2) the requirement that any responsive action be strictly
necessary to respond to the perceived threat; (3) the need for any such
action to comply with the applicable rules and obligations of
international law; and (4) the requirement that a "defending" state
publicly demonstrate ex post facto, to the extent appropriate, the
evidence in support of a perceived threat. (Other comparable features
exist between the two standards, characterized below as "clarifying
provisions," as the new standard conceptually tracks the prevailing
norms but does so while introducing greater precision.)
ii. Clarifying Provisions. One area in which the proposed
approach provides greater specificity is the standard of proof used to
gauge the threat. Rather than require something akin to the loosely
defined "sound" evidence "capable of objective assessment, ' 256 the
proposed standard would establish a firmly grounded and widely
understood legal standard entailing a demonstration by "clear and
compelling" (or "clear and convincing") evidence. 257 In addition, while
the new proposal would affirm the existing requirement that a
defending state pursue all reasonably available peaceful means of

255.
See Cassese, supra note 52, at 520 ("Changes, if any, can only be introduced
piecemeal....").
256.
See supranote 42 and accompanying text.
257.
The Author acknowledges that the existing rule might already reflect the
"clear and convincing" evidence test, see id., but that remains open to debate. To the
extent that it does not, the new proposal would have the additional benefit of
perceptibly elevating the evidentiary threshold.
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dispute resolution 258 before launching a proactive defensive strike,
the new proposal would clarify that such nonmilitary alternatives
must be both "objectively feasible and meaningful" and would treat
this requirement as an "affirmative and continuing duty." The
proposed approach would also make clear the degree of likelihood
Rather than something akin to "certain" or
required before25 attack.
"near-certain," 9 the standard would be "effective irrevocability," a
high but operationally friendly threshold.
Further, the reform proposal would make explicit that, in
connection with taking actions necessary and strictly tailored to repel
the threat, a defending state must reasonably expect to succeed and
limit its damage to a level roughly comparable to that expected to be
inflicted by the threat. Finally, the new proposal would expressly
require that the reasonableness standard be applied to evaluate the
lawfulness of a state's actions taken on an ex ante basis and that it
account for the "totality of circumstances."
iii.
Substantive Distinctions. The reform proposal reflects two
major departures from today's legal standard governing proactive
self-defense between states. First, the Caroline notion of temporal
imminence would be replaced by the more flexible concept of a state
acting in the "last window of opportunity." Although this represents
more than a marginal change, there is reason to believe that states
are becoming more amenable to this view. 260 Second, the reform
proposal would apply a hybrid reasonableness test to evaluate the
permissibility of a state's exercise of proactive defensive force. This
test would differ from the existing standard as it would inextricably
link objective and subjective considerations-taking into account the
defending state's sensibilities when judging its conduct objectively,
rather than simply evaluating the state as an entirely neutral player.
Although this feature would require a conceptual shift, it is possible
that states, at some level, already factor in such subjective
perceptions when weighing reasonableness 261 and may be

258.
See supranote 179 and accompanying text.
259.
See, e.g., Hofmeister, supra note 11, at 39-40 (describing the Caroline
formula).
260.
In light of Iraq's subsequent behavior, many states have reconsidered their
initial criticism of Israel in its 1981 preemptive strike on Iraq's Osirak nuclear reactor.
See FRANCK, supra note 108, at 106 (indicating states' reappraisal of Israel's conduct);
Beres, supra note 85, at 99 ("[M]uch of the world, however grudgingly, has changed its
assessment of Israel's 1981 air attack and of the associated objectives of preventing
nuclear weapons proliferation."). In addition, the Security Council failed to condemn a
four-day U.S. and U.K. bombing campaign in 1998 (known as Operation Desert Fox)
against biological and chemical facilities in Iraq, even though no chemical or biological
attack was known to be imminent. Rockefeller, supra note 72, at 134.
261.
For example, one could contend that the international community's
reasonably supportive reaction to Israel's first strike in the 1967 Six-Day War
accounted for, among other factors, Israel's "mental state" as a country that had been
embattled since the moment it won sovereignty (May 1948) and its survival was in no
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increasingly inclined to do so as society at large becomes more
262
psychologically attuned.

VI. CONCLUSION

This Article has attempted to articulate a reformed legal
standard to govern proactive self-defense. This standard-crafting
exercise is important not only because of the potentially high stakes
entailed in any use of military force, but also because the presumed
standard for anticipatory self-defense is so vaguely defined that-as a
consequence of their uncertain legal obligations-states are left to
take greater liberties in exercising their right of self-defense, and may
even end up offending principles of international law itself. This
undertaking is particularly challenging given the prevailing
ambiguities, the strongly held and competing perspectives concerning
this body of law, and the difficulty in shaping a standard that would
apply in any number of operational circumstances.
This Article began by identifying the current legal standard in
order to establish a working baseline. It adopted, with caveats, the
emergent standard that appears to approximate Webster's Caroline
formula.
That formula, which stands essentially for the basic
elements of necessity, imminence, and proportionality-and little
more-is viewed critically on several grounds, but chiefly for its lack
of clarity (too much regarding what constitutes legally sanctioned
defensive force) and failure to comport with legal realism (states are
increasingly vulnerable to an undefended first strike).
Against that presumed standard, this Article identified a set of
criteria that, in the aggregate, provided an analytical framework for a
more robust and meaningful legal standard. The criteria necessitated
a standard that is at once clear, flexible, comprehensive, and
objective. In addition, the standard must be realistic both in order to
meet contemporary security developments that have emerged since
1945 and to ensure that states will view it as legitimate. Finally, the
standard must be shaped in such a way that it diminishes, rather
than increases, the prospect of instability and armed conflict.
This Article then applied those factors operationally rather than
conceptually by first outlining three substantive elements: gauging
the threat, exhausting peaceful alternatives, and taking responsive

way guaranteed. See ALEXANDROV, supra note 15, at 153-54 (outlining the support and
critique's of Israel's first strike).
262.
For instance, domestic courts have become increasingly receptive to
hearing from expert witnesses about the psychology of a battered woman when
evaluating the lawfulness of one murdering her husband even absent an imminent
threat. E.g., Skopets, supra note 49, at 756-57 (discussing the parallels between
preemptive strikes and battered woman's syndrome).
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action. The proposal supplied an evidentiary standard ("clear and
compelling")
and
a
standard
of review
(a hybrid-style
"reasonableness" test), as well as a set of procedural safeguards.
Although the proposal would grant states leeway on the urgency
element by dispensing with temporal imminence, it would hold states
to a clearer, and arguably no lower, threshold with respect to both the
likelihood ("effective irrevocability") and the standard of proof
required for a threatened attack. One should, therefore, view the
proposal as a constructive realignment rather than as a radical
departure from the existing baseline standard.
Finally, the proposal's utility will depend on its capacity for
adoption as the governing law. In that regard, the gap between the
presumed existing standard and the proposed standard overall is not
significant and could reasonably be bridged over time. Doubtless,
this is a substantively difficult, politically charged, and highly
nuanced issue that will probably take many years and the occurrence
of countless more armed conflicts before it can be settled in a
meaningful way. In the meantime, states should seriously consider
alternatives to the current standard, particularly ones that provide
greater clarity and align more realistically with the twenty-first
century's conditions of warfare.
Otherwise, and until then, the
heightened risk of hostilities, particularly those stemming from
misunderstanding, error, and abuse in the exercise of defensive first
strikes, will likely persist.

